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In the 1946 Frank Capra film It's a Wonderful Life, an angel
saves the film's protagonist, George Bailey, from committing sui-
cide. Still believing non-existence preferable to life, George wishes
he had never been born. The angel grants his wish and shows
George what the world would have been like without him. In the
vision that unfolds, George learns that his younger brother, Harry,
loses his life at the age of nine because George is not there to
save him from drowning. If George had been around to save him,
Harry would heroically have saved many lives during the war..The
town druggist is no longer spared ignominy and imprisonment
because George is not there to prevent him from accidentally poi-
soning a customer. George's wife, Mary, remains alone and her
children are never born. Without his civic leadership, George's
town sinks into moral depravity under the domination of one
malevolent man. Given this privileged view of what the world
would have been like without him, George discovers a previously
undisclosed meaning that his life has for himself and others.
Things have changed since 1946. What was once an unques-
tioned good (the inestimable worth of each human life) is today
not only questioned, but renounced. Official recognition and sanc-
tion for the oddly conceived "right" to renounce this inherent
good is now demanded of legislatures, voters, and courts. Propo-
nents have waged an aggressive campaign in recent years to make
assisted suicide' both acceptable and legal. If they prevail, It's a
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1 Unless otherwise qualified, we use the terms "assisted suicide" and "euthanasia" to
mean aiding or assisting another person to kill himself (assisted suicide in the strict
sense) or killing another person at his request (often called active, voluntary euthanasia).
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Wonderful Life and its happy ending will be drastically rewritten. In
the revised version, one imagines the angel, in response to
George's asserted right to kill himself, arguing what once seemed
so self-evident: George has no "right" to end his life. Today one
could envision George, his eyes unopened by the privileged
glimpse of what life would be like without him, continuing to
believe nonexistence preferable to life.'
Contemporary advocates of assisted suicide in the United
States have concentrated much of their lobbying efforts on the
West Coast. In the late 1980s, efforts to place euthanasia measures
on the ballot in California and Oregon met with defeat.' Howev-
er, by the early 1990s, proponents had gathered enough signatures
to place separate euthanasia initiatives before voters in Washington
and California. In each state, the initiatives were defeated by the
same narrow margin of fifty-four to forty-six percent.4
Finally, in November 1994, Oregon residents by a vote of fifty-
one to forty-nine percent approved a ballot initiative that allows a
competent terminally ill adult to obtain a doctor's prescription for
medication for the patient's express use in ending his or her life.'
Within days of its passage, the Oregon initiative was challenged in
federal court on the grounds that it violates several federal laws as
well as the constitutional rights of the terminally ill.6 On Decem-
ber 7, 1994, one day before the initiative was to go into effect, a
federal judge issued a temporary restraining order and, on Decem-
ber 27, a preliminary injunction, preventing the initiative from tak-
2 In a similar vein, readers of C.S. Lewis might imagine Screwtape (an angel too,
but with different loyalties) advising his nephew Wormwood, a novice tempter:. If you
want to do great destruction to those insufferable humans, convince them that any at-
tempt to discourage public ills or promote the common good is just a veil for intoler-
ance or an abridgement of their rights. See C.S. LEWIS, THE SCREWrAPE LETrERS (1964).
3 Two Los Angeles attorneys were unable to gather enough signatures to place the
"Humane and Dignified Death Act" on the November 1988 California ballot. See Allan
Parachini, Bringing Euthanasia to the Ballot Box, L.A. TiMES, Apr. 10, 1987, § 5, at 1.
4 Sandi Dolbee, Right-to-Die Measure Rejected By State Voters, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRI-
BUNE, Nov. 4, 1992, at A-3; Jay Mathews, Term Limits, Assisted Suicide, Abortion Rights Losing
in Washington, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1991, § 1, at A28.
5 The Oregon Death With Dignity Act, Oregon Ballot Measure 16 (approved Nov.
8, 1994) (not yet codified) [hereinafter Oregon Act] (enforcement enjoined by Lee v.
Oregon, No. 94-6467, 1994 WL 728858 (D. Or. Dec. 27, 1994), appeal docketed, No. 95-
35031 (9th Cir. Jan. 11, 1995)). See Spencer Heinz, Assisted Suicide: Advocates Weigh In,
OREGONIAN, Dec. 9, 1994, at Al ("voters-by a ratio of 51 to 49 percent on Measure
16-made Oregon the only place in the world to legalize doctor-assisted suicide").
6 Lee v. Oregon, No. 94-6467, 1994 WL 728858 (D. Or. Dec. 27, 1994), appeal dock-
eted, No. 95-35031 (9th Cir. Jan. 11, 1995).
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ing effect until the constitutional issues could be fully heard.7
On the judicial front, most courts continue to insist that states
have an interest in preventing suicide. A few judges, however, have
suggested or ruled outright that some persons have a right to
assisted suicide. In 1986, a California appellate judge concluded in
a concurring opinion that a twenty-eight-year-old woman with se-
vere cerebral palsy had the right "to enlist assistance from others,
including the medical profession, in making death as painless and
quick as possible."' In May 1993, a Michigan trial judge invalidat-
ed that state's law banning assisted suicide.9 For the sake of a
complete appellate record, the judge went on to rule that at least
two plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their claim that the ban
violated their right to end their own lives. 10 In a separate case,
another Michigan trial judge ruled that the same law was unconsti-
tutionally overbroad because in some cases it interfered with the
right to commit a "rational" suicide."1 This latest decision, until
its reversal by a state appellate court, threatened to derail
Michigan's attempt to enforce its own laws and thereby prevent
retired pathologist Jack Kevorkian from continuing to help people
in that state commit suicide. 2
The medical and legal professions continue to oppose assisted
suicide in their official pronouncements.13 Yet individuals like
Kevorkian persist in testing the limits of both society's restraint
and the law. In January 1988, an anonymous story entitled "It's
Over, Debbie," appeared in the Journal of the American Medical
7 Id. (preliminary injunction).
8 Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 307 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (Compton,
J., concurring).
9 Hobbins v. Attorney Gen., No. 93-306-178 CZ, 1993 WL 276833 (Mich. Cir. Ct.
May 20, 1993) (Stephens, J.), aFld in part and rev'd in part, 518 N.W.2d 487 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1994), affid in part and rev'd in part, People v. Kevorkian, Nos. 99591, 99674, 99752,
99758, 99759, 1994 WL 700448 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994) (consolidated cases).
10, Id. at *7.
11 People v. Kevorkian, No. 93-11482, 1993 WL 603212 at *20 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Dec.
13, 1993) (Kaufman, J.), rev'd sub noam. Hobbins v. Attorney Gen., 518 N.W.2d 487 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1994), aj'd in part and rev'd in par; People v. Kevorkian, Nos. 99591, 99674,
99752, 99758, 99759, 1994 WL 700448 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994) (consolidated cases).
12 State criminal charges were filed against Kevorkian after he helped seventeen
people end their lives. Edward Walsh, Kevorkian Charged in Assisted Suicide, WASH. POST,
Aug. 18, 1993, § 1, at Al, A16.
13 The American Medical Association has declared its "unqualified opposition to
physician-assisted suicide." AMERICAN MED. NEws, Dec. 20, 1993, at 7; see AMA COUNCIL
OF ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, Rep. No. 1-93-8. The American Bar Association has
similarly rejected the invitation to recognize and advocate a "right" to assisted suicide. See
infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
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Association in which a young resident physician described how he
killed a twenty-year-old cancer patient to alleviate her suffering.14
The story sparked a storm of protest, with many opposing the
journal's decision to publish the story. 5 Some lawyers have like-
wise advocated a right to assisted suicide. The Bar Association of
Beverly Hills recommended that the American Bar Association
adopt a resolution in favor of assisted suicide, a recommendation
that the ABA rejected 6 after the ABA's Commission on Legal
Problems of the Elderly voiced its opposition.
17
To reflect on the social changes that have made it possible
even to conceive of such developments"8 when only a generation
ago the irrationality of suicide would have gone unquestioned is
no mere exercise in nostalgia. It is safe to speculate that fear and
misunderstanding are among the complex causes of this change in
attitude. One fear is that today's sophisticated medical technology
will injure those it was designed to help, prolonging human suffer-
ing instead of alleviating it.'9 In addition, many still fail to appre-
14 It's Over, Debbie, 259 JAMA 272 (1988) (author's name withheld by request).
15 By the next issue, the journal had received over 150 letters in response to It's
Over, Debbie, with writers expressing opposition to the resident's act by 4-to-1 and oppo-
sition to the journal's decision to publish the piece by 3-to-1. See, e.g., Gaylin et al., ,Doc-
tors Must Not Kill 259 JAMA 272 (1988) ("[N]ow is the time for the medical profession
to rally in defense of its fundamental moral principles, to repudiate any and all acts of
direct and intentional killing by physicians and their agents").
16 B.D. Colen, Take Care: Beware of Rich Lawyers, NEWSDAY, Feb. 11, 1992, at 65; ABA
Rejects Doctor-Assisted Suicide Proposal: Attorneys Say Laws Could be Abused, HOUS. POST, Feb.
4, 1992, at A8; Tony Mauro, Lawyers Say No to Assisted Suicide USA TODAY, Feb. 4, 1992
at 3A. One Beverly Hills lawyer had argued that "the poor are in desperate need of this
aid." Colen, supra, at 65.
17 American Bar Association, Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly, Memo-
randum of Jan. 17, 1992, reprinted in 8 IssuES L. & MED. 117 (Summer 1992) [hereinaf-
ter ABA's Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly].
18 Suicide has even begun to receive sympathetic treatment by writers of television
programs and popular literature. NBC News correspondent Betty Rollin wrote a book
about how she provided her terminally-ill mother with pills to take her own life, and the
book became a made-for-television movie. See BErr ROLLiN, LAST WISH (1985); David
Mills, 'Last Wish: Going Gently, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1992, at G1. The movie dismisses
"the medical professionals who refuse to help Rollin . . .as heartless and priggish." Id. at
GI. The television series Picket Fences (CBS Television Broadcast) aired an episode sympa-
thetically depicting a nun who helps patients kill themselves while humming "Killing Me
Softly." Peter Johnson, When in Rome, Ws.: Life Turns Offbeat on Ticket Fences,' Low-Rated
Drama Draws Critical Raves, USA TODAY, Jan. 22, 1993, at 1D (final ed.).
19 One doctor writes:
The public is scared of the health care system, scared of the intensive care unit,
[and] scared of inadequately treated pain . . . . In a sense, assisted suicide be-




hend the important distinction between actually killing someone
(which has never been permitted in our society) and declining to
subject an incurable, dying person to aggressive medical treatment
(which generally has been permitted)."
This article comments on efforts to persuade the legislative
and judicial branches to recognize and protect a right to assisted
suicide. These efforts seek not only to transform the law, but also
to transform society. For at the root of advocacy for assisted sui-
cide is an invitation to accept as true a host of false assumptions
that would radically alter the principles around which Americans
have organized their society. Proponents of assisted suicide assume
erroneously that the human problems and conditions that trigger
a wish to take one's own life are appropriately addressed by aban-
doning the person to, and even facilitating; that wish. They wrong-
ly assume that the community has no interest in preventing an
individual from carrying out suicidal thoughts, and even presup-
pose an obligation to enable individuals to carry out such wishes.
They wrongly assume that suicide is merely the consequence of
cool, reasoned reflection, the expression of a free, informed, and
rational choice. They wrongly assume that, for some, suicide is the
only remaining option. Finally, they inescapably make the errone-
ous assumption that some people do not merit protection from
self-destruction because for them death is preferable to life.
This article attempts to expose some of the errors in these
presuppositions and to demonstrate why the efforts of assisted
suicide proponents should be resisted. In Part II, we explain why
assisted suicide is unsound public policy. In Part III, we demon-
strate that the United States Constitution does not create, protect,
or enshrine a right either to take one's own life or to have an-
other person's "assistance" in taking one's life.
Don Colburn, Debate on Assisted Suicide Gains Steam: Court Decisions and Public Polls Suggest
Distrust of the Present System of End-of-Life Car WASH. POST, May 10, 1994, at 8 (Health
Sect.). Fear of abandonment is also a significant factor.
[The medical director of Hospice of Washington] said she occasionally is asked
by a distraught or fearful patient to help hasten death. But such patients almost
never persist in their request, she said, once they are assured by a hospice nurse
or doctor that they won't be abandoned and will be kept comfortable to the
end.
Id.
20 Infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
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II. Is ASSISTED SUICIDE SOUND PUBLIC POLICY?
A. The Arguments from Autonomy and Beneficence
Many who favor a right to assisted suicide base their argument
on personal autonomy. The argument is usually some variant of
the claim that "it is my body, and I should be able to do with my
body as I choose."21 Proponents of assisted suicide assert that "life
and death are highly personal matters, and no authority should be
permitted to make life and death choices for the individual."
The assertion that assisted suicide should be permitted be-
cause of individual autonomy cuts a wide swath. Pressed to its
logical conclusion, it would eliminate many laws having a long and
well-settled history that in one degree or another restrict individu-
al choices, even those about one's own body. The law, for exam-
ple, does not allow Russian roulette, a deadly duel with a willing
adversary, sale of oneself into slavery, or use of certain
drugs-even when these activities are entirely consensual and
structured in a way to avoid any possibility of direct harm to an-
other. That these prohibitions in some way limit choices affecting
one's own body is not persuasive grounds for abolishing them.
Similarly, the ban on assisted suicide should not be cast aside
simply because it too limits personal choices.2
21 One example of this philosophy may be found in Justice Blackmun's dissent in
Bowers v. Hardwick "[T]his case is about 'the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men,' namely, 'the right to be let alone.'" Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
22 As the Supreme Court has observed, "[tihe statute books are replete with consti-
tutionally unchallenged laws against prostitution, suicide, voluntary self-mutilation, brutaliz-
ing 'bare fist' prize fights, and duels, although these crimes may only directly involve
'consenting adults.'" Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 n.15 (1973). The
Court has rejected the view that "one has an unlimited right to do with one's body as
one pleases . . . ." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973); see also Jacobson v. Massachu-
setts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (state may require compulsory vaccination over an individual's
objections).
In Jacobson, Justice Harlan remarked:
[T]he liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person
within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at
all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are man-
ifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common
good. On any other basis organized society could not exist with safety to its
members. Society based on the rule that each one is a law unto himself would
soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy.
Id. at 26. What the Court rejected was precisely "autonomy" in its root sense: each per-
[Vol. 70:3
ASSISTED SUICIDE
Some would argue that laws like those cited above should be
abolished because they are "paternalistic" and prohibit conduct
that is "victimless." Like John Stuart Mill, they believe that "the
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of civilized community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others." ' The people of our nation have never so con-
fined the role of government. Consider the act of dueling. Two
willing duelers may believe their conduct is reasonable, but that
does not alter our judgment as a community that dueling is an
unreasonable way of dealing with personal conflict, even if people
choose to resolve their differences that way.
The same can be said of selling oneself into slavery. An indi-
vidual may believe it reasonable and advantageous to sell himself
into lifelong servitude, believing perhaps that it is the only way to
deliver himself and his family from a life of poverty. But our soci-
ety recognizes that selling oneself into slavery is no answer to
poverty, and it will not permit the parties to enforce such a trans-
action even if entered into voluntarily. The social and legal rules
that prohibit dueling and enslavement even when these acts are
entirely consensual are based on an objective value, one which is
connected intrinsically to how we organize ourselves as a people
and that may not be overridden or trumped by individual
choice.24 Individuals have a wide range of personal choices in
structuring their personal relations, and this too is essential to the
common good. But the individual liberty which our society zeal-
ously protects does not include the freedom to resolve personal
disagreements through violence or to sell oneself into slavery.
Such choices do not serve freedom, but undermine the freedom
and the good of both the community and the individual.
son "a law unto himself" (from the Greek "auto" and "nomos").
23 JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (C. Shields ed. 1956). In some of his other writ-
ings, Mill recognized that this was an overly simplistic view of the role of civil law. See
GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, ON LOOKING INTO THE ABYss 101-02 (1994).
24 The word "choice" has become nearly talismanic in our society. A television ad
for a telephone company features an actor who proclaims, "I need more choices." A bev-
erage is touted as "the clear choice." A spokesman for a car company states "It's your
choice, America." In the political arena, "choice" is the label used by those opposing
government regulation or prohibition of abortion, or by those who favor personal selec-
tion of any school, public or private, for their children at government expense. Labels
mask the reality that the end or object of a choice, not the mere freedom to choose,
frames our judgment whether government should regulate that choice or not. No one,
for example, would seriously contend that one had the freedom to choose to commit a
homicide or engage in a duel.
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The law, of course, has even more to say when the conduct of
one person infringes directly on the rights of another person. All
states, for example, impose criminal penalties for homicide. But
other public policies, such as prohibiting Russian roulette, are no
less insulated from the interests and rights of others even if, when
violated, they infringe less directly on another's rights. Indeed, the
conduct proscribed by so-called "victimless" crimes is, upon further
reflection, not at all victimless. Many state laws, for example, re-
quire that one wear a seat belt when driving a car or a helmet
when operating a motorcycle.' The injuries resulting from acci-
dents in which a seat belt or motorcycle helmet is not worn are
not limited to the immediate victim. The accident victim's injuries
impose a burden on the entire community. Medical resources
used to treat accidental injuries sustained by someone not wearing
a seat belt or motorcycle helmet reduce the pool of resources
available for treating others in need of medical care." Likewise, it
is erroneous to believe that the death of a person by dueling has
no impact on anyone other than the duelers, or that the availabili-
ty of a violent and state-sanctioned means of resolving personal
conflicts would not lead to a general deterioration in how people
within our society organize their relationships.
Laws which may first appear to limit personal choices actually
serve a positive function for both the community and the individu-
al. A society in which dueling was just another option for resolving
personal differences would witness a gradual erosion in how its
citizens regarded their own lives and the lives of others. Children
in such a society would come to perceive dueling as just one more
choice among an arsenal of personal choices. In short, the con-
sciences of the younger generation would be sharply distorted by a
public morality which looked upon a senseless and violent act
25 For a list of states with mandatory seatbelt and motorcycle helmet laws, see BU-
REAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
623 (1993).
26 The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") of the U.S. De-
partment of Transportation estimates that:
[I]n 1992, safety belt use prevented 5,226 fatalities and 136,100 moderate-to-criti-
cal injuries. The economic savings from these safety benefits totalled $11 billion.
This includes reductions in medical costs, lost productivity, insurance administra-
tion, legal costs, emergency services, vocational rehabilitation, workplace costs and
other economic impacts.
Letter from NHTSA economist Lawrence J. Bincoe (June 24, 1994) (on file with au-
thors). Certainly there are other harmful consequences to the family and community of a
suicide victim apart from the economic impact.
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merely as the combatants' personal and private choice. They
would come to view life as expendable. The expectation of civility
and trust in our personal relationships would be lost."
To take an example relevant to our subject, patients know
they can confide in and trust their doctors because their doctors
are healers and not killers. If physicians were permitted to kill, the
trust patients currently place in them would dissipate. How could
one be assured, for instance, that one's doctor held no profession-
al bias in favor of killing rather than exploring treatment alterna-
tives, or even had sufficient familiarity with those alternatives?
Patients in such a world would have to be quite careful of what
they say to their treating physician lest their unscreened medical
complaints come to be perceived as pleas for ending life.
The autonomy argument cuts a wide path in another sense as
well: It is not, and logically cannot be, limited to any particular
class of persons. If individual autonomy is grounds for intentional-
ly taking one's life, then only the individual's values are relevant
to that decision. Those arguing in favor of assisted suicide on the
basis of autonomy, if they are to be consistent, cannot be satisfied
with a law restricting the availability of assisted suicide to the ter-
minally ill; if personal choice and autonomy are the only criteria,
then the patient's medical condition and motive for suicide are
irrelevant." A twenty-one-year-old distressed over a failed romance
would have as much right to commit suicide under the autonomy
argument as the seventy-year-old with incurable cancer. This, how-
ever, is not the way we respond as a rule to people who contem-
plate or attempt suicide. "It is commonplace for the police and
other citizens, often at great risk to themselves, to use force or
stratagem to defeat efforts at suicide, and it could hardly be said
that thus to save someone from himself violated a right."' When
faced with a suicidal relative or friend, one's thoughts do not turn
naturally to how one can be of assistance in committing the sui-
cide. It follows that a right to assisted suicide, if such a right were
to exist, could not rest merely on autonomy, but would have to be
27 The proliferation of firearms and the depiction of violence in film and on the
airwaves provide instructive examples of how the public's recognition of the sanctity of
life can be dulled by policies and practices that do not protect it.
28 "[I]f one sustains an autonomy-based right to suicide, then one's motives for
exercising this right are not within the scope of proper inquiry, any more than one's
motives for attending a particular church would be." Gerald D. Coleman, Assisted Suicide:
An Ethical Perspective 3 IssuEs L. & MED. 267, 269 (Winter 1987).
29 John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 279 A.2d 670, 672 (NJ. 1971).
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based on some objective value or norm.
The need to ground any asserted right to assisted suicide in
an objective norm is apparent when one contrasts it with other
equally personal but socially prohibited conduct. Dueling, selling
oneself into slavery, and taking hallucinogenic drugs are no less
personal and concern the body no less directly than committing
suicide. Proponents of a right to assisted suicide, in order not to
concede the permissibility of these equally personal acts, must
argue that suicide is different because it is in some objective sense
reasonable to leave that decision, but not others, to personal
choice. This, however, is a very different kind of claim because it
does not rest on the assertion that an individual can do with his
body as he or she chooses (the autonomist argument), but rather
on the claim that there is a range of decisions affecting one's
body which are reasonably left to individual choice. Significantly,
the claim that certain decisions are reasonably left to individual
choice is an appeal to an objective or public value, not mere per-
sonal wishes. It suggests that a line must be drawn between legiti-
mate and illegitimate choices. Even to frame the process as distin-
guishing choices based on "legitimacy" concedes much to one's
opponents.
An example may help to illustrate this. Our society leaves to
the individual the choice of a career. We may think it entirely
unreasonable for someone (with or without the aptitude) to pur-
sue a career as a lawyer. However, in the choice of a career, we
let people make their own mistakes. It is possible for the individ-
ual to correct his career choice later if it turns out to have been
the wrong choice. The consequences of letting society rather than
the individual decide the choice of a career would be disastrous
for both the individual and society.' Dueling is different. First,
30 Complete state domination of such decisions would radically subject the goals and
aspirations of individuals to the ends of the state, the very definition of a totalitarian
regime. See SHANNON M. JORDAN, DECISION MAKING FOR INCOMPETENT PERSONS: THE LAW
AND MORALITY OF WHO SHALL DECIDE 128-30 (Charles C. Thomas ed., 1985). The oppo-
site extreme, an unrestrained and excessive individualism, is inconsistent with a correct
understanding of the human person and equally destructive of individual dignity. Jordan
writes:
A theory of individualism which seeks to affirm the self as an isolated and atom-
istic unit of society ultimately fails because such a self is empty . . . . [T]he cir-
cumstances of birth, nurture, and life within a community of shared values are
constitutive of the person, for without these the person is a shell consisting only




although it is sometimes reasonable for someone to enter the
practice of law, it is never reasonable to settle personal disputes by
dueling. Second, the deadly result of a duel cannot be undone or
corrected later by the participants. Third, the consequences of
prohibiting dueling are not disastrous to the individual or society,
but beneficial to both.
Suicide is more analogous to dueling than it is to the choice
of a career: (1) it is not a reasonable answer to a human problem
or need, (2) it cannot be corrected by a later decision, and (3)
the consequences of not helping someone commit suicide are not
disastrous but beneficial to the individual and society. No one, of
course, can dispute that an act of suicide is incapable of correc-
tion by a later decision.3' But why is it that suicide is never rea-
sonable or beneficial?
Among the many possible reasons that one might articulate, it
can be said that suicide is never reasonable because the rational
response to any human need or problem precipitating a wish to
kill oneself is to address the need or problem, not to destroy the
subject. Suicide can never be beneficial because it takes away the
one good-life itself-that makes all other goods possible. The act
of suicide is as ill-suited to human needs and problems as the act
of razing one's home would be if it were the proffered solution to
saving the home from a fire. Furthermore, if (as most will agree)
human self-preservation is good, and if virtue is understood as that
which disposes us to what is good, then self-destruction can never
be an act of virtue even if it is rooted in a desire to escape hard-
ship. We have on this point the counsel of one of the greatest
thinkers of antiquity:
To kill oneself to escape from poverty or love or anything else
that is distressing is not courageous but rather the act of a
coward, because it shows weakness of character to run away
from hardships, and the suicide endures death not because it is
a fine thing to do but in order to escape from suffering. 2
These are surely not the only means of demonstrating that
31 See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 283 (1990) (an erro-
neous and effectuated decision to cease providing life-sustaining medical treatment "is not
susceptible of correction" but is "final and irrevocable"); Lee v. Oregon, No. 94-6467,
1994 WL 728858, at *10 (D. Or. Dec. 27, 1994), appeal docketed, No. 95-35031 (9th Cir.
Jan. 11, 1995) ("Death is overwhelmingly final and not subject to reversal, mitigation or
correction").
32 ARisTOTLE, NIcHOMACHEAN ETHics 130 (J. Thompson trans. 1977).
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suicide is an irrational act. For example, one could cite numerous
studies showing that well over ninety percent of suicides-even
among those who are seriously ill-are committed in a state of
mental illness." But the burden of proof concerning a value as
fundamental as human life itself should be borne by those who
are trying to demonstrate the rationality of self-destruction. They
bear the burden of proving why generations of men and women
have been mistaken in believing that suicide is morally and civilly
wrong.
At this point, those favoring a "right" to commit suicide will
typically argue that this decision is best left to some class of indi-
viduals because suicide is objectively reasonable or beneficial in
some cases. When forced to defend the right to commit suicide on
the basis of an objective norm, proponents of assisted suicide
typically assert that the suicidal act is reasonable for a class of pa-
tients such as the terminally ill. Helping such a patient kill him-
self, they argue, benefits him because it ends his suffering.
However, even if proponents of assisted suicide are motivated
by compassion and empathy for human pain and suffering, as
many may be, allowing terminally ill people to commit suicide
would not reasonably address their pain and suffering any more
than killing the unemployed would answer the problem of unem-
ployment. The terminally ill would no more derive a benefit from
self-destruction than would those who suffer from the recent loss
of a close family member or those who struggle with alcoholism.
All of these groups-the unemployed, the bereaved, the addict-
ed-need the care and compassion of our communities, and all of
them happen to have high suicide rates.' That the taking of hu-
man life is not an answer to terminal illness is as true of the ter-
minally ill as it is of the unemployed, recently widowed, and ad-
dicted. Observes Dutch physician Karel Gunning, "[i]n a civilized
33 See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
34 Thomas J. Marzen et al., Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 DUQ. L REv. 1, 4
(1985). The New York State Task Force on Life and the Law writes:
No matter how carefully any guidelines are framed, assisted suicide and euthana-
sia will be practiced through the prism of social inequality and bias that char-
acterizes the delivery of services in all segments of our society, including health
care. The practices will pose the greatest risks to those who are poor, elderly,
members of a minority group, or without access to good medical care.
THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAw, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT: AS-




country, you kill the pain, not the patient." '
Singling out the terminally ill as a class of people who "de-
serve" to have their suicidal impulses respected, moreover, is logi-
cally incoherent unless one presupposes that, in some objective
sense, their life is not worth living. But, as a civilized society, we
make no such claim with respect to any human being. A rule
permitting a person "to assist the suicide of another because the
person killed has a certain condition or status, [such as a terminal
illness,] would create a glaring anomaly in the law.""6 It would
mean that persons with terminal illnesses are not entitled to pro-
tection from their suicidal impulses, even though other people are. As-
serting that the terminally ill should not be protected from their
suicidal impulses leads inescapably to the position that, objectively,
their lives are not worth protecting, that they are (as the fictional
George Bailey believed of himself) better off dead than alive. With
that kind of assertion, one surrenders any claim to being a de-
fender of individual liberty, and instead becomes the arbiter of
whose life is worthy of being lived and whose is not.
It would still be true that the needs of terminally ill persons
are not solved by their death even if we had no means of reliev-
ing their pain and suffering. In fact, today there are other means
of relieving pain, which should completely foreclose any public
policy argument that the terminally ill should be helped to kill
themselves to end their pain. In the vast majority of cases, it is
possible to bring pain associated with terminal illness within man-
ageable limits. 7 Requests for assistance in committing suicide of-
35 The Issue is the Issue, Not the Man: Dying with Dignity Must be Separated From the
Kevorhian Controversy, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1993, at B6.
36 James Bopp, Jr., Is Assisted Suicide Constitutionally Protected?, 3 ISSUES L & MED.
113, 116 (1987).
37 See Leon R. Kass, M.D., Neither for Love nor Money: Wy Doctors Must Not Kill, THE
PUB. INTEREST, Winter 1989, at 25, 32-33 (stating that "[a]dequate analgesia is apparently
possible in the vast majority of cases, provided that the physician and patient are willing
to use strong enough medicines in adequate dosages and with proper timing."); D. Alan
Shewmon, M.D., Active Voluntary Euthanasia: A Needless Pandora's Box," 3 ISSUES L. & MED.
219, 220 (1987), Citing PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-suSTAiN-
ING TREATMENT 275-97 (1983) ("[E]xcessive pain, discomfort and anxiety are nearly always
examples of inadequate treatment, not inadequate ethics."); see also Don Colburn, Assisted
Suicide: Doctors, Ethicists Examine the Issues of Pain Contro Comfort Care and Ending Life,
WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1993, at Z7 (reporting that "95 percent of all pain is controllable
with medication").
Nor is pain the motivation in most cases of physician-assisted suicide. A 1990 study
showed that in the Netherlands, the only Western nation currently to permit euthanasia,
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ten dissipate when pain is adequately managed.' The ethics
chairman of the Academy of Hospice Physicians emphatically
writes:
As a doctor who has been involved in hospice care for
more than 14 years, I can state without equivocation that the
physical sources of suffering associated with dying all can be
controlled. Most often, such symptoms as pain, shortness of
breath and nausea, yield to routine evaluation and straightfor-
ward interventions. Even the pain of end-stage cancer common-
ly can be managed with oral medications. In a small percent-
age of cases, pain or other bothersome symptoms do require
advanced interventions. Rarely, sedation is required to effective-
ly alleviate pain, breathlessness or terminal agitation.
Symptom management is not always easy. Effective therapy
may require the efforts of a physician with special interest in
palliative medicine and a team of hospice-trained nurses, con-
sultant pharmacists and others. Yet I want to state again clearly
that in all cases the physical distress of the dying can be con-
trolled. 9
One should also contemplate the likely practical consequences
of a social practice of helping terminally ill persons kill them-
selves. Public and private attention would be diverted from the
application of protocols to bring pain within tolerable limits to
finding ways of simply stopping the pain by killing the patient.
Were assisted suicide to become an accepted practice, some por-
tion of private and public health care funds and resources which
could have been used to identify and apply medical plans for
alleviating pain and suffering will be used instead to end the
patient's life.' This has especially serious implications in an age
pain alone was the reason for requesting euthanasia in only ten of 187 cases. Tamara
Jones, Setting a Date for Death: By Legally Sanctioning Mercy Killing the Netherlands Has Be-
come an International Model for the Practice, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1993, at Al.
38 Kathleen M. Foley, The Relationship of Pain and Symptom Management to Patient Re-
quests for Physician-Assisted Suicide, 6 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 289, 290, 296 (July 1991).
Foley concludes: "Any debate that focuses on options for termination of life for patients
with far-advanced disease should first focus on assessing the availability of continuing care
for such patients." Id. at 296.
39 Ira R. Byock, Kevorkian: Right Problem, Wrong Solution, WASH. PosT, Jan. 17, 1994,
at A23.
40 If this concern seems speculative, one need only observe that the legalization of
assisted suicide in Oregon was followed almost immediately by an announcement that the
State will now reimburse the cost of suicide pills for its Medicaid patients. The lethal
doses will rank very high on the priority list which guides Oregon's Medicaid rationing
plan because they will be reimbursed under the code for "comfort care." Diane M.
Gianelli, Oregon Doctors Fear Fallout From Assisted Suicide, AMERICAN MED. NEWS, Jan. 23-30,
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of health care rationing.4 Our present incentive to provide social
support and compassionate care for the dying will erode if we can
simply rid ourselves of the dying:
Once one removes the presumption that doctors should pre-
serve life until its natural end .... one reduces the social in-
centives to treat the terminally ill with respect. When suicide
becomes an acceptable medical option, the question asked at
every stage of treatment will not be "How can we make the
patient's remaining life more livable?" but "Wouldn't it be
better for the patient to die now?"4"
This does not mean that people in the final stages of a termi-
nal illness must be subjected to aggressive medical intervention.
Neither the law nor good medicine requires that every available
medical procedure be used to keep dying patients alive. In recog-
nizing a right to refuse treatment, our courts have maintained a
distinction between refusing treatment on the one hand, and di-
rect killing on the other. Courts have been nearly unanimous in
holding that states have a legitimate interest in preventing the
latter." Decisions to refuse treatment are "legally and ethically
1995, at 1, 27 (Oregon's acting health officer says he "expect[s] the procedure to be
covered under the state's controversial Medicaid plan"); Associated Press Wire Story (unti-
fled), Nov. 11, 1994 (the chairman of the Oregon Health Services Commission says he
believes prescribing lethal drugs "is covered under the state's health care plan's provision
for 'comfort care' for the terminally ill"); Jennifer Dixon, The Treatment Stops Here, Doctors
Told: The Priorities of Health Care Rationing Have Been Brought Out Into the Open in Oregon,
LONDON TIMES, Apr. 27, 1993, at 17 (showing that comfort care under the Oregon plan
is ranked 151 out of 688 medical treatments).
41 Dr. Byock writes:
What happens if assisted suicide and euthanasia become legal in today's environ-
ment? I submit that in the absence of adequately funded palliative care pro-
grams and residential hospice settings, it will become our responsibility to rec-
ommend assisted suicide to those who lack basic financial or family resources.
What a horrific way for society to respond to the needs of the destitute and dy-
ing.
Byock, supra note 39, at A23.
42 John West, Initiative 119 Won't Let You Take Back A Suicide Wish, THE NEWS, Oct.
23, 1991, at A2, quoted by Evan J. Kemp, Jr., Chairman, Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Paternalim, Disability, and the Right to Di4 Remarks before the National Right
to Life Convention (June 12, 1992), reprinted in 9 IssuEs L. & MED. 73, 75 (1993).
Certainly, the human consequences of assisted suicide are primary, but there are
some adverse economic consequences as well. Under the Oregon Act, an insurance com-
pany could not refuse to pay life insurance benefits in cases of suicide. If life insurers
were unable in Oregon to exclude payment of benefits in cases of suicide, "prices for
much-needed life insurance will increase and could become unaffordable for many Ore-
gonians." Letter from John Mangan of the Standard Insurance Company to Phil Keisling,
Oregon Secretary of State (Jan. 10, 1994) (on file with the Secretary).
43 See e.g., Donaldson v. Lungren, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) ("Here
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distinct from ...decisions to inject a lethal agent with the inten-
tional purpose of terminating life."44 Assisted suicide "involves not
letting the patient die, but making the patient die. .. ." A law
permitting assisted suicide would eliminate this widely recognized
distinction.
there are no life-prolonging measures to be discontinued. Instead, a third person will
simply kill [the plaintiff] . . . ."); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1986) (a "decision to allow nature to take its course is not equivalent to an
election to commit suicide with . . . parties aiding and abetting therein"); Bartling v.
Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225-26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (suicide is distinguishable
from death from natural causes which results from disconnecting the respirator of a
comatose, terminally ill patient); Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 487 (Cal.
CL App. 1983) ("Euthanasia, of course, is neither justifiable nor excusable in Califor-
nia."); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626, 635 n.29 (Mass. 1986)
("[T]he law does not permit suicide," which is distinguishable from the decision to re-
move life-sustaining treatment from a patient who is in a persistent vegetative state and
unlikely to regain cognitive functioning); Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370
N.E.2d 417, 426 n.11 (Mass. 1977) (distinguishing a "competent, rational decision to
refuse treatment when death is inevitable" from an act of intentional self-destruction); In
re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (NJ. 1985) (deciding life-sustaining medical treatment is
distinguishable from suicide because it "merely allows the disease to take its natural
course; if death were eventually to occur, it would be the result, primarily, of the under-
lying disease, and not the result of a self-inflicted injury."); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647,
665 (N.J. 1976) ("We would see ... a real distinction between the self-infliction of dead-
ly harm and a self-determination against artificial life support ... in the face of irre-
versible, painful and certain imminent death."); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71 n.6 (N.Y.
1981) (distinguishing a natural death from self-inflicted killing). But see Bouvia, 225 Cal.
Rptr. at 307-08 (Compton, J., concurring) (endorsing a right to assistance in committing
suicide for a quadriplegic, bedridden patient).
44 ABA's Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly, supra note 17, at 118.
45 STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLI-
TICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 236 (1993). This is not to say that an omission
could never be tantamount to suicide:
It would not make much sense to say that one may not kill oneself by walking
into the sea, but may sit on the beach until submerged by the incoming tide;
or that one may not intentionally lock oneself into a cold storage locker, but
may refrain from coming indoors when the temperature drops below freezing.
Even as a legislative matter, in other words, the intelligent line does not fall
between action and inaction but between those forms of inaction that consist of
abstaining from "ordinary" care and those that consist of abstaining from "exces-
sive" or "heroic" measures.
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 296 (1990) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring).
Any difficulty in distinguishing between omissions in care which are permissible and
those which are impermissible because they are equivalent to suicide should not deter us
from placing suicide to one side of the line. In common parlance, two wrongs do not
make a right. The issue of how one determines whether an omission is tantamount to
suicide lies beyond the scope of the present article, which is concerned primarily with
the illegitimacy of assisting someone to take his own life through some active means such
as a lethal injection.
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B. The Issue of Voluntariness
Suicide, like selling oneself into slavery, is a renunciation of
freedom because it circumscribes (and, in the case of suicide,
completely eliminates) one's prospective freedom to act. A deci-
sion "not to be free" or "not to be" does not place one on the
doorstep of liberty, but rather pushes one out the door and over
the precipice. Indeed, even assuming arguendo that one could
conceive of a situation in which the only option were suicide, that
choice strictly speaking would no longer be free. If an individual
were so severely distressed and depressed that he saw suicide liter-
ally as his only remaining option, this would appear to be prima
facie proof that he was unable to adequately evaluate all his op-
tions.46 Furthermore, health professionals tell us that, in the real
world, talk of suicide is often not a genuine expression of the
individual's wishes at all, but a cry for help.47
However, setting these objections aside and assuming again
arguendo that an act of suicide could in principle be viewed as an
exercise of freedom rather than a renunciation of life and liberty,
it would be virtually impossible in practiceto assure that a suicide
was wholly free or voluntary. The inability to verify the person's
consent leads perhaps to the most pernicious aspect of laws sug-
gested by proponents of a right to assisted suicide: They do not
(and for various reasons cannot) ensure that a request for suicide
is intelligently and voluntarily made. Indeed, the measures pro-
posed by advocates of assisted suicide, including the recently en-
acted Oregon Act, do a great deal to prevent an assessment of
whether a request to be killed is knowing and voluntary.
For example, under the Oregon Act no psychiatric evaluation
is required unless the patient's attending physician believes that
the patient has "a psychiatric or psychological disorder, or depres-
46 Edward D. Pellegrino, M.D., Doctors Must Not Kill in 3 J. CuNICAL ETHIcS 95
(Summer 1992). Dr. Pellegrino writes:
When a patient opts for euthanasia, he uses his freedom to give up his free-
dom. In the name of autonomy, the patient chooses to eradicate life and con-
sciousness, the indispensable conditions for the operation of autonomy. He loses
control over a whole set of options, all of which cannot be foreseen and many
of which would be of importance if life-the basis of freedom-had not been
forgone. Moreover, if suffering is so intense that it limits all other options, and
euthanasia is the only choice, then that choice is really not free.
Id. at 96.
47 See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
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sion causing impaired judgment."48 General practitioners, how-
ever, are seldom adept at recognizing depression. A significant
number of suicides occur shortly after the decedent has been seen
by his general physician.49 Indeed, there is nothing in the Ore-
gon measure to prevent suicide "assistance" from becoming the
practice of a select group of doctors predisposed toward facilitat-
ing suicide, particularly when many other physicians will object to
assisting a suicide under any circumstances. Any patient can shop
around until he or she finds an obliging physician." And that
same physician will determine whether a psychological evaluation
is done.
The Oregon Act does not even require that family members,
those most likely to be acquainted with and concerned about the
patient, be consulted or notified of a patient's suicidal wish. 1
What a frightening prospect for the relatives of a terminally ill
person to know that he received "help" in killing himself while
they, with the law's complicity, were kept at bay. Among the many
serious questions a federal judge found sufficient to warrant en-
joining enforcement of the Oregon law was the question of wheth-
er family notification may be significant "(a) in diagnosing the
severity of a patient's depression, (b) in providing emotional sup-
port that may be lacking and lead the patient to decide to live,
[and] (c) in assisting a trained professional to determine whether
the patient is being unduly influenced."5
The problem of voluntariness, from a psychiatric standpoint,
is inherent in the very request to have oneself killed. One cannot
ask whether a decision to commit suicide is knowing and voluntary
48 Oregon Act, supra note 5, at § 3.03.
49 David C. Clarke, "Rational" Suicide and People with Terminal Conditions or Disabilities,
8 ISSUES L. & MED. 147, 151 (1992) (reporting that "50% of suicide victims have seen a
physician within a month of their death, and 80% within six months. Few of these physi-
cian contacts were actual health professionals").
50 Even when the patient is referred for counseling, psychotherapy, which under
other circumstances could lead to treatment of the pathology underlying the suicidal
wish, is severely compromised from the start because the patient then enters therapy with
the sole intention of securing certification that he is "fit" to commit suicide, thereby
eliminating any incentive to address the underlying problem. See, e.g., Herbert Hendin,
Seduced by Death: Doctors, Patients, and the Dutch Cure, 10 ISSUES L. & MED. 123, 150-51
(1994).
51 The attending physician need only "ask" the patient to notify next of kin; the pa-
tient who declines "shall not have his or her request [for assistance in committing sui-
cide] denied for that reason." Oregon Act, supra note 5, at § 3.05.
52 Lee v. Oregon, No. 94-6467, 1994 WL 728858, at *12 n.2 (D. Or. Dec. 27, 1994),
appeal docketed, No. 95-35031 (9th Cir. Jan. 11, 1995).
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without treading upon terrain in which the patient's freedom is
already greatly circumscribed. Studies show that ninety-five percent
of those who commit suicide have "a major psychiatric illness at
the time of death."53 One physician, reporting significant psychiat-
ric morbidity among a majority of patients requesting assistance in
committing suicide, concludes that "[r]ational suicide is an
oxymoronic statement." '4 Anyone contemplating putting an end
to his or her own life is clearly and obviously vulnerable.
Another indication of the difficulty in assessing the intelligibil-
ity and voluntariness of a wish to be killed is that, as illustrated in
Bouvia v. Superior Court,55 the wish can be transient. Terminally ill
patients expressing suicidal thoughts "usually abandon the wish to
commit suicide" after their depression has been treated," or after
receiving appropriate treatment for pain:
[C]ancer patients admitted to hospices sometimes gain a new
lease on life once their pain has been appropriately treated,
and discharge themselves in order to seek more aggressive
medical therapy. When a patient is depressed about a chronic
or terminal illness, it is really quite impossible to determine
whether he or she is mentally competent to make such a mon-
umental, irreversible, once-in-a-lifetime decision as suicide. This
is why the law has traditionally erred on the side of regarding
attempted suicide as an intrinsically irrational decision .... I
Curiously, in other areas of law, we do not allow persons to
relinquish their interests without carefully scrutinizing their wishes.
It is ironic, for example, that defendants in criminal proceedings
receive more protection in ensuring knowing and voluntary choic-
es under the law than patients would receive under measures
permitting assisted suicide. A defendant may not relinquish his
53 WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT, supra note 34, at 126.
54 Foley, supra note 38, at 295.
55 Bouvia was a twenty-eight-year-old woman with cerebral palsy who sought removal
of her feeding tube. See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127 (Cal. Ct App.
1986). She changed her mind about starving to death after she won her lawsuit.
Shewmon, supra note 37, at 230. We offer the Bouvia case only by way of example. Re-
moval of a feeding tube presents a number of issues requiring separate treatment which
lie outside the scope of this article. For a nuanced discussion of some of the moral is-
sues entailed in a decision whether to continue or withhold artificially administered nutri-
tion or hydration, see generally U.S. BISHOPS' COMMrrrEE FOR PRO-IjFE AcrvrES, NrTiU-
TION AND HYDRATION: MORAL AND PASTORAL REFLECTIONS, reprinted in 21 ORIGINS 705
(1991).
56 WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT, supra note 34, at x.
57 Shewmon, supra note 37, at 231.
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liberty by pleading guilty to a criminal charge unless a court has
satisfied itself, after a hearing, that the plea is entered knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily. 8 The defendant whose guilty plea is
accepted can later challenge his conviction on appeal if he can
prove that the hearing was conducted improperly, or that his plea
was not truly voluntary, or that he was inadequately informed of
the consequences of entering a guilty plea. 9 Under current pro-
posals to legalize assisted suicide, there are no comparable safe-
guards or opportunities to argue later that the patient was ill-in-
formed, depressed, or even incompetent.
Many assisted suicide laws, like one recently proposed by eu-
thanasia proponent Derek Humphry, would require no signifi-
cant period of reflection or counseling, even though such require-
ments are often imposed in other areas of the law for major life
decisions. Medicaid regulations, for example, require a thirty-day
waiting period before a patient may be sterilized." Consumer
protection laws often give purchasers a period of days or even
years to cancel a transaction. 2 Even if one endorsed a "right' to
end one's life, it would be anomalous to subject the exercise of
that right, which is irreversible and eliminates all other choices, to
less advance reflection than that required for decisions affecting
lesser interests.
Euthanasia advocates will respond that too much due process
interferes with the right to a quick, painless death. But therein lies
the contradiction. They pursue "a goal which is inherently inconsis-
tent a procedure for death which both (1) provides ample safe-
guards against abuse and mistake; and (2) is 'quick' and 'easy' in
operation." 3 The impossibility of providing ample safeguards
58 Godinez v. Moran, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 2687 (1993); Parke v. Raley, 113 S. Ct. 517,
523 (1992). A judge accepting a guilty plea must personally inquire of the defendant
whether he or she understands the charge and the consequences of a guilty plea, and
whether the admitted conduct constitutes the offense with which the defendant is
charged. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 464-67 (1969).
59 McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466; Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962).
60 See DEREK HUMPHRY, LAWFUL Exrr: THE LIMITs OF FREEDOM FOR HELP IN DYING
133-52 (1993).
61 42 C.F.R1 §§ 441.253, 441.257, 441.258 (1993).
62 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1982 & Supp. 1994) (giving consumers three business days to
rescind any consumer credit transaction in which the lender retains or acquires a security
interest in the consumer's principal dwelling, or three years if the lender does not make
the requisite disclosures); 12 C.F.RL § 226.15 (1994) (same); 17 AM. JUR. 2D Consumer
Protection § 277 (1990) (state laws giving consumers a right of rescission).
63 Yale Kamisar, Some Non-religious Views Against Proposed 'Mercy-Killing' Legislation, 42
MINN. L. REV. 969, 981-82 (1958).
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against abuse and mistake counsels against any effort to codify a
"right" to have oneself killed quickly and easily.
Although "coercing" someone to kill himself would be unlaw-
ful under both the Oregon and Humphry measures,' a person
contemplating suicide will likely be susceptible to the most subtle
influences and the perceived reactions of others. For example, the
prospect of relieving family members of the emotional and finan-
cial burden of continued care may be just the added inducement
one needs to take his life, particularly if the law were to make
such a killing an acceptable option. In such cases, it might not be
the patient's suffering that finally disposes of the issue, but the
expectation that his loved ones (perhaps by their own behavior or
implied suggestions) will be relieved emotionally and financially.
This danger is aggravated by the fact that not everyone currently
has equal access to health care: "[T]hose without adequate care
options ... may be subtly or not so subtly encouraged to 'opt
out' of life via aid in dying precisely because they lack decent care
alternatives or because they may become serious financial burdens
on their families."'
Professor Kamisar, in words that are as applicable today as
when he wrote them decades ago, asks:
Is this the kind of choice, assuming that it can be made in a
fixed and rational manner, that we want to offer a gravely ill
person? Will we not sweep up, in the process, some who are
not really tired of life, but think others are tired of them; some
who do not really want to die, but who feel they should not
live on, because to do so when there looms the legal alterna-
tive of euthanasia is to do a selfish or a cowardly act? Will not
some feel an obligation to have themselves "eliminated" in
order that funds allocated for their terminal care might be
better used by their families or, financial worries aside, in or-
der to relieve their families of the emotional strain involved?'
64 Oregon Act, supra note 5, § 4.02; HUMPHRY, supra note 60, at 144.
65 ABA's Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly, supra note 17, at 121.
66 Kamisar, supra note 63, at 990. Along the same lines, Peter McGough, a Seattle
physician and chair of the Washington State Medical Association's legislative committee,
stated that if the Washington euthanasia initiative proposed there had passed, "many
poor and elderly patients would have turned the 'right to die' into a 'duty to die' to
avoid being a burden to their families . . . . [T]here would have been court challenges
to extend the right of assisted suicide to the mentally incompetent as well as the compe-
tent .... " Dennis L. Breo, MD-Aided Suicide Voted Down; Both Sides Say Debate to Continue,
266 JAMA 2895 (1991) (quoting Dr. McGough).
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There has been publicity in recent years over suicides attribut-
able to mimicking characters in films or to the influence of partic-
ular lyrics to songs. Impressionability has often been cited as a
factor contributing to suicides. For example,
[i]n 1933 a twenty-four year old student, Mieko Ueki, commit-
ted suicide by leaping into the crater of a volcano named
Mount Mihara on the island of Oshima, Japan. Another stu-
dent who learned of her suicide followed her example. The
suicide caught the attention of the Japanese press. Others be-
gan to jump into the volcano. Soon, five to six persons were
committing suicide there daily . . . . "By the end of 1933,
Mihara had claimed a total of 143 known suicides. By the end
of 1934, the police had forcibly prevented a staggering total of
1,200 persons from ending their lives in Mihara's pit .... But
despite the best efforts of police, at least 167 persons leaped in
Mihara during 1934. In addition, 29 of those who had been
saved at the crater's edge fulfilled their intention by leaping
from the boat taking them back to Tokyo .... In 1936, 619
persons leaped to their deaths inside Mihara, bringing it the
dubious renown of luring more suicides than any other spot on
earth."
Much of the attractiveness of committing suicide at Mihara
evidently came from the attention and sanction of society. Al-
though there was official disapproval and there were attempts
to prevent suicides both by the public authorities and volunteer
private agencies, in the end, the public attention amounted to
a glorification of self-destruction in the volcano.'
The phenomenon of suicide clusters is not confined to Japan.
In the month after Marilyn Monroe's death by an apparent sui-
cide, suicides in the United States increased by twelve percent.'
More recently, in 1984 six teenage suicides occurred in a subur-
ban Dallas high school within a six-month period; the same year, a
cluster of sixteen teenage suicides occurred in another Dallas
suburb within a two-month period.69 The publication of Derek
67 Marzen et al., supra note 34, at 141-42, quoting E. ELLis & G. ALLEN, THE TRAI-
TOR WrrHIN: OUR SUICIDE PROBLEM 89, 95-96, 98 (1961).
68 Mar-zen et al., supra note 34, at 140, citing David P. Phillips, The Influence of Sug-
gestion on Suicide: Substantive and Theoretical Implications of the Werther Effect, 39 AM. Soc.
REV. 340, 350-51 (1974). The Werther of the title is the suicidal hero of Goethe's eigh-
teenth century romantic novel The Sorrows of Werther which likewise "stimulated a rash of
suicides." Marzen et al., supra note 34, at 141. "Copies of the novel were found on many
corpses." Id.
69 Id. at 139, citing Teenagers in Crisis: Hearing Before the Select Committee on Children,
Youth and Families, House of Representatives, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1983) (discussing the
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Humphry's "how to" manual for suicide"0 has been linked to
many suicides using the methods he describes-most often among
people who are not terminally ill.7 ' Is it any less likely, if suicide
comes to be ensconced in law as an acceptable option for dealing
with human suffering, that many will begin to contemplate it who
might otherwise have never considered it? We should be very
careful what practices we sanction legally because the law is a
teacher.72 The tendency to accept on a moral level practices that
are sanctioned by the law counsels against enshrining in law a
practice that encourages people to confront (or rather, flee from)
their problems by taking their own lives.
Legal and social rules, because they teach, do more than
merely assure a minimally tolerable world; they allow a society to
see a particular good. Social rules, in other words, provide an in-
sight into the nature of the world and our own humanity that one
might never learn without these rules. 3 One example of the "see-
ing" value of a social rule is a fictional short story entitled "The
Lottery."74 In that story, all the members of a community volun-
tarily take part in a lottery. The "winner" is stoned to death. It is
entirely consensual; even the prospective winner agrees in advance
to be bound by the terms of the lottery. To have grown up in
such a society would mean growing accustomed to a deadly and
barbaric ritual. It would mean accepting as normative a practice
that cuts against time-honored notions about the value and dignity
of human life. Children brought into such a society would be
inculcated to see human life as cheap and dispensable, instead of
valuable and worthy of preservation. Recognition of the value and
dignity of human life would be lost in a world whose citizens
Dallas Suicide and Crisis Center).
70 DEREK HUMPHRY, FINAL EXIT: THE PRACTICALITIES OF SELF-DELIVERANcE AND ASSIST-
ED SUICIDE FOR THE DYING (1991).
71 Peter M. Marzuk et al., Increase in Suicide by Asphyxiation in New York City After the
Publication of Final Exi 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1508 (1993).
72 THOMAs AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Pt. 1, Q. 92, art. 1 (the proper effect of a
law is to make those for whom it is promulgated good).
73 The New York State Task Force on Life and the Law writes:
If assisted suicide and euthanasia are legalized, it will blunt our perception of
what it means for one individual to assist another to commit suicide or to take
another person's life. Over time, as the practices are incorporated into the stan-
dard arsenal of medical treatments, the sense of gravity about the practice would
dissipate.
WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT, supra note 34, at xiv.
74 SHIRI.EY JACKSON, THE LOTERY AND OTHER STORIES 291-302 (1991).
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ceased to foster an appreciation for it.
C. The Slippery Slope
If a law were enacted creating a right to assisted suicide for a
particular class of patients such as the terminally ill, it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to restrict the availability of assisted
suicide only to those within this class. The Oregon Act75 makes
assisted suicide available to any person with a "terminal disease,"
which is defined as "an incurable and irreversible disease that has
been medically confirmed and will, within reasonable medical
judgment, produce death within six months."" The Humphry
measure similarly would make euthanasia available for a person
with "an incurable or irreversible condition which will, in the
opinion of two certifying physicians exercising reasonable medical
judgment, result in death within six months."77
An immediate textual problem with such proposals is that
they define life expectancy without reference to medical interven-
tion. For example, a person with an indefinite or high life expec-
tancy with medical treatment (e.g., insulin treatment for a diabetic)
but with less than six months life expectancy without such treat-
ment would presumably qualify for euthanasia. Thus, in practice the
measures actually proposed would not limit qualified candidates to
incurable, dying patients. Second, the measures only require a
judgment by two physicians (even nonspecialists will do), 7 not
certainty or even a medical probability that the patient will die
within six months. There is a serious risk of error in making such
predictions. One physician observed that "prognoses for survival
75 Oregon Act, supra note 5.
76 Id. § 1.01.
77 HUMPHRY, supra note 60, at 135.
78 Interestingly, the Hemlock Society's own newsletter has published a nurse's article
explaining that "second physician" requirements for the diagnosis of terminal illness are
ineffective as safeguards against abuse. Lauraine Thomas, Living Will Could Let You Down,
HEMLOCK Q., Jan., 1992, at 10. Thomas writes:
The notion that the patient is safeguarded by . . . requir[ing] a similar diagno-
sis and opinion by two or three "uninvolved" physicians or medical experts is at
once naive and tragic. The fact is that such "consultations" are extraordinarily
easy to come by.
There is much truth in the concept of an "old boys club" among physi-
cians. I have yet to know of any consulting physician disagreeing with any other
physician who requests such a consultation. The motions are gone through and
the outcome always is the same--total agreement with the attending physician.
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are never that accurate; about 10% of patients admitted to hospic-
es to die end up being discharged home because of either remis-
sion or inappropriate diagnosis. ""
Furthermore, under a law like the one proposed in Oregon,
the certifying physician's opinion would likely be tainted by the
very definition upon which the right depends. A doctor would be
tempted to "fudge," especially in marginal cases, and to certify
that a person has only six months to live, especially if the doctor
was predisposed to allowing the patient to kill himself. Prosecutors
would be hard pressed to uncover abuses when the victim already
is dead from euthanasia. Indeed, the authorities would have little
opportunity to scrutinize requests to be killed because those deci-
sions would be made privately.
Even if a class of patients could be adequately defined'o and
enforcement could be assured-both unlikely assumptions-it is
reasonable to expect that any law permitting assisted suicide for
some class of patients, such as the terminally ill, will evolve within
time to permit or even require euthanasia for other patients, even
those who are not competent. Many euthanasia advocates them-
selves have acknowledged that once they acquire support for a
right to euthanasia for some terminally ill patients, it will be easier
for them to secure support for a more expansive euthanasia
law."1 The first expected point of expansion from the Oregon
79 Shewmon, supra note 37, at 223; see also Jean-Pierre B~dos et al., Early Predictors of
Outcome for HIV Patients With Neurological Failure, 273 JAMA 35 (1995) (showing that death
within a certain number of months is difficult to predict even in such a universally fatal
disease as AIDS).
S0 "[S]eventeen years of experience with State Living Will statutes that have used
'terminal condition' as a prerequisite to patient directives have demonstrated that
'terminal' lacks any truly objective, operational definition. The terminal requirement is
an .. .unworkable requirement .... " ABA's Commission on Legal Problems of the El-
derly, supra note 17, at 120.
81 Derek Humphry, founder of the Hemlock Society, has stated:
The public is demanding [surrogate decision making in euthanasia], but I have
conceded the question in the interest of securing legislation for terminal illness
first. But there is no question in my mind that after physician-assisted suicide is
lawful, there are two questions that we must go on to addressi (1) how incom-
petent people may be helped to die by their own advance directives and (2) the
question of elderly suicide.
Derek Humphry Discusses Death With Dignity with Thomasine Kushner, 2 CAMBRIDGE Q.
HEALicARE ETHics 57, 59 (1993).
In an interview with a state official, Jack Kevorkian expressed his desire in the fu-
ture to assist those patients in their late twenties and thirties who do "not want to live
anymore and [have] felt this way since a very early age." Michigan v. Kevorkian, No. 90-
390963-AZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 5, 1991) (Gilbert, J.), reprinted in 7 IssuEs L. & MED. 107,
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and Humphry measures will likely be the six-month time limit.
"Regardless of where the time limit is placed [e.g., three months,
six months, or one year], there will be patients just beyond it who
will demand their 'right' to euthanasia .... ."s Why, it will be ar-
gued, should the right to euthanasia be limited to those whose life
expectancy is less than six months when others face the prospect
of suffering for an even longer period of time? The right to eutha-
nasia would likewise be asserted on behalf of those who are not
terminally ill but only disabled.
Why, its proponents would claim, should euthanasia only be
available to the dying, forcing others to endure a lifetime of suf-
fering? After this, the next likely group to be targeted would be
the incompetent:
If the underlying purpose of the recommendation is to alleviate
unreasonable pain and suffering of dying persons, why should
the person who is suffering, but not competent, be denied
relief? Are the demented or mentally retarded or mentally ill
less entitled to relief from suffering than the competent? Do
they suffer less for being incompetent? Yet, if they are equally
entitled to this relief, have we not arrived at state-sanctioned,
selective death?'
As Justice Cardozo observed, any principle tends "to expand
itself to the limit of its logic . . . ."" Once any right to euthana-
sia is conceded for a class of persons, it will be difficult to confine
the right to that class. Since all medical conditions can be placed
on a continuum, any distinction will simply be challenged as arbi-
trary. For example, what criteria will be used to distinguish the
eighty-year-old dying of cancer from the seventy-year-old with
Alzheimer's disease, the sixty-year-old with severe depression and
advanced leukemia, or the fifty-year-old depressed over an unsuc-
cessful business venture or the loss of a spouse? Anyone who
doubts the reality of this slippery slope should consider the Neth-
erlands, where over a thousand people a year are involuntarily
euthanized.' The literature of the right-to-die movement suggests
111 (1991).
82 Shewmon, supra note 37, at 223.
83 ABA's Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly, supra note 17, at 120.
84 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (1949).
85 Nat Hentoff, The Slippery Slope of Euthanasia, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1992, at A21.
Hentoff writes:
[T]he September 1991 official government Remmelink Report on euthana-
sia in the Netherlands revealed that at least 1,040 people die every year [in that
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that obtaining a right for the terminally ill is merely the opening
salvo.
8 6
Having reviewed the policy reasons why legislators and the
electorate should reject calls to legalize assisted suicide, we con-
sider next the question whether the United States Constitution
creates or protects a right to assisted suicide.
III. Is THERE A FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO ASSISTED SUICIDE?
A. Substantive Due Process and the Need for Judicial Restraint
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides that no state shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."8'
The Supreme Court has held that, in addition to ensuring proce-
dural fairness by the government, the Due Process Clause safe-
guards certain liberties of which the government can deprive no
citizen under even the fairest of procedures.s Even a fair trial
country] from involuntary euthanasia. Their physicians were so consumed with
compassion that they decided not to disturb the patients by asking their opinion
on the matter. Now the slope has become more slippery in the Netherlands.
The Dutch Pediatric Association's panel on neonatal ethics has asked the govern-
ment to permit euthanasia for infants so damaged that their "quality of life" is
low. Says Dr. Zier Versluys, chairman of the group: "It's not always good to
prolong someone else's life, because life is not always good.
Id.; see also Cor Spreeuwenberg, The Stoy of Laurens, 2 CAMBRIDGE Q. HFALTHCARE ETHics
261-64 (Summer 1993) (a Netherlands physician's account of how his own brain-damaged
infant son was euthanized).
86 See, e.g., Shewmon, supra note 37, at 223-25. Comparisons with the abortion right
are apt. What began as an asserted right to abortion to protect a woman's life and
health evolved into a generalized right to abortion on demand at any stage of pregnancy
and for virtually any reason, or no reason at all. See e.g., Thornburgh v. American Col-
lege of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 783-84 (1986) (Burger, CJ., dissent-
ing) ("We have apparently already passed the point at which abortion is available merely
on demand"). For a description of the process by which the Court expanded, and later
contracted, the abortion right, see generally Mark E. Chopko, Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services: A Path to Constitutional Equilibrium, 12 CAMPBELL L. REv. '181 (1990).
87 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment, by its own terms, is a
limitation on the power of states. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment places
a comparable limitation on the power of the federal government.
88 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. CL 2791, 2804 (1992), in which the
Court wrote:
Although a literal reading of the [Due Process] Clause might suggest that it
governs only the procedures by which a State may deprive persons of liberty, for
at least 105 years, at least since Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660-661 (1887),
the Clause has been understood to contain a substantive component as well, one
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would not save from constitutional invalidation a law that made it
a criminal offense to view a sunset, plant a tree, or spend an af-
ternoon with one's children, to use ludicrous examples.
The Supreme Court's treatment of substantive due process has
a complex history,9 making casual generalization hazardous for
any commentator. Nevertheless, as a general rule the Court has
resorted to one of two tests when deciding whether legislation
complies with the substantive component of due process. 0 Under
the first test, legislation bearing no reasonable relationship to any
legitimate governmental objective is unconstitutional.91 A second,
more rigorous test of constitutionality applies to those interests
that the Court deems "fundamental."92 Laws affecting fundamen-
tal interests will be strictly scrutinized. Generally, under this more
rigorous test, government may not substantially interfere with .a
fundamental right except by a law narrowly tailored to accomplish
a compelling, governmental objective.
As is well known, the differences in application between ratio-
nal relation review and strict scrutiny are significant. Rational re-
lation scrutiny is not rigorous. It has traditionally been very diffi-
cult to obtain a judicial declaration that a law does not satisfy this
minimal standard.93 The same cannot be said of strict scrutiny,
and laws subjected to such scrutiny are almost always invalidated.
At present it must be admitted that this two-story structure
does not rest on an altogether sturdy foundation. First, there has
been and continues to be considerable debate among judges and
scholars regarding how appropriate it is to read into the Constitu-
tion rights not explicitly mentioned there.94 Second, the opinions
themselves are not always uniform or even clear regarding the
analytical framework for deciding substantive due process claims.
"barring certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures
used to implement them." Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986).
Id. at 2804 (parallel citations omitted).
89 See generally JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw ch. 13 (1978) (provid-
ing a readable historical overview).
90 Id. at 410.
91 See e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978)
(setting out minimum rationality standard).
92 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
93 NowAK ET" AL., supra note 89, at 410 ("As long as there is any conceivable basis
for finding such a rational relationship the law will be upheld. Only when a law is a
totally arbitrary deprivation of liberty will it violate the substantive due process guarantee7
under the rational relationship test).
94 Debate among the justices themselves began as early as 1798 in Calder v. Bull, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
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One could infer from the text of a number of Supreme Court
decisions, for example, that only those interests that can be
deemed fundamental are protected under the substantive compo-
nent of the Due Process Clause.95 Justice Scalia most recently has
suggested that it is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Due Pro-
cess Clause, that protects persons from substantively unreasonable
laws:
[W]hat protects us ... from being assessed a tax of 100% of
our income above the subsistence level, from being forbidden
to drive cars, or from being required to send our children to
school for 10 hours a day, none of which horribles is categori-
cally prohibited by the Constitution. Our salvation is the Equal
Protection Clause, which requires the democratic majority to
accept for themselves . . . what they impose on you and me.
96
When the Court first began to consider which guarantees of
the Bill of Rights applied to the states through the substantive
component of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause,
the applicable test was whether or not the affected interest was
fundamental.7 Nevertheless, many of the Court's decisions today
would be inexplicable if the Due Process Clause protected only
those substantive interests that are fundamental." Therefore, an
95 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("in 'an
attempt to limit and guide interpretation of the [Due Process] Clause, we have insisted
not merely that the interest demonstrated as a 'liberty' be 'fundamental' . . . but also
that it be an interest traditionally protected by our society"); Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (rights are not incorporated into the Due Process Clause unless
they are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and "so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental") (quoting Snyder v. Massachu-
setts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) ("[It is settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure.
Thus all fundamental rights comprised within the term liberty are protected by the feder-
al Constitution from invasion by the states").
96 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). See also Tax Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711,
(1993), in which Justice Scalia writes:
I am willing to accept the proposition that the Due Process Clause . . . incor-
porates certain substantive guarantees specified in the Bill of Rights; but I do
not accept the proposition that it is the secret repository of all sorts of other
unenumerated, substantive rights.
Id. at 2726-27 (Scalia, J., concurring).
97 Palko, 302 U.S. at 325; Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105.
98 Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1805 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("a
liberty interest per se is not the same thing as a fundamental right"); Webster v. Repro-
ductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 520 (1989) (plurality opinion holding that abortion
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insufficient basis exists to conclude that the Court has razed its
two-story building.
Indeed, the Court may have added a few side rooms to the
existing two-story structure. In its latest pronouncement in the two-
decade-old abortion controversy, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 9 a
majority of justices refused to categorize abortion as a fundamen-
tal right triggering strict scrutiny, thereby abandoning a major
tenet of the Court's first abortion case, Roe v. Wade."° Neverthe-
less, four justices in Casey held that the Constitution forbids a state
to pass a law that may unduly burden a woman's right to an abor-
tion before viability.' Justice Blackmun would have applied the
higher strict scrutiny standard. 2 Thus, at least five justices-a
majority of the Court-would invalidate any abortion law that
unduly burdened a woman's right to an abortion before viability.
The Court holds such a burden to exist if the challenged law
imposes "a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion of a nonviable fetus."' Consequently, the current stan-
is not a "fundamental right" but a "liberty interest"); Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 789-90 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (stating
that the abortion decision is "a species of 'liberty' . . . subject to the general protections
of the Due Process Clause," but is not a "fundamental" right); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 171-74 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for applying strict
scrutiny to abortion regulations and urging use of the rational relation test); see also
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-61 (1990) ("the principle that
a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions").
99 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
100 Indeed, Casey established an entirely different analytical framework for reviewing
abortion legislation. As Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in the case:
Roe decided that a woman had a fundamental right to an abortion. The joint
opinion [of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in Casey] rejects that view.
Roe decided that abortion regulations were to be subjected to "strict scrutiny"
and could be justified only in the light of "compelling state interests." The joint
opinion rejects that view . . . .Roe analyzed abortion regulation under a rigid
trimester framework, a framework which has guided this Court's decisionmaking
for 19 years. The joint opinion rejects that framework.
Id. at 2860 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
101 Id. at 2819-20 (O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, JI.); id. at 2842-43 (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
102 Id. at 2845-46 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
103 Id. at 2820. Lower courts in subsequent abortion cases have not consistently ap-
plied the undue burden test. Compare Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 14 F.3d 848, 863
n.21 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that abortion regulations are unconstitutional if they impose
an undue burden in a large fraction of cases), with Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12 (5th
Cir.) (stating that abortion regulations are unconstitutional if they impose an undue
burden in all circumstances), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 656 (1992), and with Fargo Women's
Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying both tests).
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dard of judicial review for abortion appears to be more rigorous
than the rational relation test, yet less rigorous than the, strict
scrutiny test.
Significantly, the three justices who explicitly endorsed the
undue burden standard in the abortion context justified their
selection of that test only by citing the concurring opinions of
prior abortion cases. This underscores all the more that abortion
now appears to occupy its own jurisprudential island, with no
readily explainable relation to the remainder of the Court's sub-
stantive due process cases.
Indeed, much of the principal opinion in Casey attempts to
justify the Court's treatment of abortion not as a matter of first
impression, but rather on the basis of stare decisis.'t° The explicit
condemnation of Roe v. Wade by four justices, and the reticence of
three others to defend it on its original grounds, suggests that a
majority of the Court no longer believes that Roe was correctly de-
cided. This in turn means that Roe and subsequent abortion cases
have at best limited precedential value today in dealing with any
issue except abortion.
Another difficulty in the Court's substantive due process juris-
prudence arises in connection with so-called "liberty interests."
Upon finding such an interest, the Court either applies the ratio-
nal relation test,"0 5 or balances "the liberty of the individual" and
104 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2817:
We do not need to say whether each of us, had we been Members of the Court
when the valuation of the State interest came before it as an original matter,
would have concluded, as the Roe Court did, that its weight is insufficient to
justify a ban on abortions prior to viability .... The matter is not before us in
the first instance ....
See also id. at 2808 ("[T]he reservations any of us may have in reaffirming the central
holding of Roe are outweighed by the explication of individual liberty we have given com-
bined with the force of stare decisis."); id. at 2814 ("decision to overrule should rest on
some special reason over and above the belief that a prior case was wrongly decided").
By thus declining to state that Roe was correctly decided, the Casey opinion "leaves a
reader . . . with the nagging sense that a majority of the Court reaffirmed Roe, even
though a differently constituted majority (the four dissenters plus one or more of the au-
thors of the Joint Opinion) believed Roe to have been wrongly decided." Paul B. Linton,
Planned Parenthood v. Casey. The Flight From Reason in the Supreme Court, 13 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REv. 15, 19 (1993).
105 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
790 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (because abortion decision is not a fundamental right
but a liberty interest, restrictions upon it do not "call into play anything more than the
most minimal judicial scrutiny"); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976) (assuming a
liberty interest exists in regulating one's own personal appearance, regulations limiting
police officers' hair length was rationally related to the promotion of safety).
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the "relevant state interests." °6 Whether these are intended by
the Court as two distinct tests is unclear. Balancing an individual's
liberty against the demands of an organized society would appear
to be a somewhat more stringent standard than merely asking
whether challenged legislation is reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental objective. However, if a balancing test is to be ap-
plied to mere "liberty interests," then to what sort of interests does
the rational relationship test apply? Unless a particular interest
qualifies as "liberty," it would not appear to come under the pro-
tection of the liberty component of the Fourteenth Amendment at
all.10 7 In other words, unless there is a deprivation of some liber-
ty, then a plaintiff would not have suffered any injury for which
protection could be sought under the liberty component of the
Due Process Clause. We see no way of wholly resolving these ana-
lytical difficulties at present, and their ultimate resolution will
likely require further guidance from the Supreme Court.
This brief outline of how the Court addresses substantive due
process claims as yet leaves at least one question of major impor-
tance unanswered: How does the Court determine whether a par-
ticular interest is a fundamental right warranting heightened judi-
cial protection, some other type of interest entitled to lesser scruti-
ny, or no constitutionally protected interest at all? This question
warrants special attention because fundamental rights, once impli-
cated, are virtually assured of trumping any asserted state interest.
The ease with which laws are judicially invalidated if found to
interfere with fundamental rights also implicates the notions of
judicial restraint, federalism, and separation of powers-all vital to
106 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (in determing
whether the state constitutionally may require clear and convincing evidence of an incom-
petent patient's wishes before termininating artifical administered nutrition and hydration,
the Court must weigh the patient's presumed "liberty interests" against the "relevant state
interests"); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982) (in determining whether an
involuntarily committed, mentally retarded individual's liberty interest in safety and free-
dom from constraint has been violated, it is necessary to balance individuals' "liberty
interests" against "relevant state interests").
107 Thus, we disagree with the conclusion of the New York State Task Force on Life
and the Law that laws not infringing "on either fundamental rights or constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interests receive only minimal judicial scrutiny, and will be upheld as long
as they are 'rationally related' to a legitimate governmental goal." WHEN DEATH IS
SOUGHT, supra note 34, at 68-69 (emphasis added). If an interest does not infringe upon
some "species of 'liberty,'" Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 790 (White, J., dissenting), overruled by
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2816 (1992), then one could not invoke
the Due Process Clause at all (unless one could predicate a violation of the clause based




our system of government.
It is important to remember that the Due Process Clause is
written in the most general terms; the Framers of that provision
did not define the term "liberty." The potential breadth of such
an open-ended concept as liberty therefore quite naturally gives
rise to concerns about the proper distribution of power in resolv-
ing pressing social questions between the federal judiciary, on the
one hand, and federal and state legislatures on the other hand.
Individual justices, to be sure, have at times written of con-
stitutionally protected "liberty" in philosophical,' even poetic
terms that seem to reflect a rugged individualism and antipathy to-
wards government."° Yet, in describing their role, the justices
have also recognized that they are interpreters, not Platonic guard-
ians, of the Constitution."' Thus, in deciding whether an interest
is entitled to substantive due process protection under any stan-
dard, the Court has made clear that "judges are not left at laige
to decide cases in light of their personal and private notions.""'
Judicial restraint, the Court has acknowledged, is necessary if our
108 "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992).
109 Justice Brandeis wrote:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the
pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature,
of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain,
pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought
to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the 'right to be let alone
- the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan wrote:
We are not an assimilative, homogeneous society, but a facilitative, pluralistic
one, in which we must be willing to abide someone else's unfamiliar or even
repellant practice because the same tolerant impulse protects our own idiosyncra-
cies .... In a community such as ours, "liberty" must include the freedom not
to conform.
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110 See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 453
(1983) ("Irrespective of what we may believe is wise or prudent policy in this difficult
area, the Constitution does not constitute us as 'Platonic Guardians' nor does it vest in
this Court the authority to strike down laws because they do not meet our standards of
desirable social policy, 'wisdom,' or 'common sense'") (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (internal
punctuation omitted), overruled in part by Planned Parenthood-v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2816-17 (1992).
111 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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nation is to remain one of laws and not people,'12 for such re-
straint ensures that the people, through their elected officials, will
remain free to debate and resolve the problems that confront the
nation. As Justice White has observed:
Iludicial] decisions that find in the Constitution principles or
values that cannot fairly be read into that document usurp the
people's authority, for such decisions represent choices that the people
have never made and that they cannot disavow through corrective legis-
lation."3
Elsewhere, Justice White writes:
The Judiciary, including this Court, is the most vulnerable and
comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made
constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the
language or even the design of the Constitution. Realizing that
the present construction of the Due Process Clause represents
a major judicial gloss on its terms, as well as on the anticipa-
tions of the Framers . . . , the Court should be extremely re-
luctant to breathe still further substantive content into the Due
Process Clause so as to strike down legislation adopted by a
State or city to promote its welfare."
4
Because a law subjected to strict scrutiny faces an especially
difficult chance of passing constitutional muster, leading very easily
to the invalidation of laws having the support of political majori-
ties, the methodology that the Court uses for identifying funda-
mental rights is critical. It is therefore appropriate, before inquir-
ing whether or how suicide or assisted suicide fit into the frame-
work of substantive due process, to pose some preliminary ques-
tions about how the Court in practice determines whether an
interest is fundamental.
112 See generally James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Webster and the Future of Sub-
stantive Due Process, 28 DUQ. L. REV. 271, 281 n.54 (1990) ("[The] danger is not only to
the integrity of the court making the decision but also to the principle of the rule of
law itself.").
113 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
787 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice White has further cautioned
that when the Judiciary announces rights not securely grounded in the Constitution, "it
unavoidably pre-empts for itself another part of the governance of the country without
express constitutional authority." Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977)
(White, J., dissenting), quoted in Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122.
114 Moore, 431 U.S. at 544.
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B. Two Methodological Principles for Identifying Fundamental Rights
To ensure judicial restraint and to prevent the Supreme
Court's substantive due process jurisprudence from becoming
simply a product of "the predilections of those who happen at the
time to be Members of [the] Court,""5 two methodological prin-
ciples for identifying fundamental rights have emerged from the
Court's decisions. First, the Court has defined fundamental rights
by reference to an objective standard. Second, -the Court has recog-
nized that fundamental rights must be identified with specificity
and with an eye toward the factual context in which the interest is
asserted.
Only brief reflection is necessary to assure oneself of the need
for an objective standard since its absence would necessarily
plunge the Court headlong into adjudication by precisely those
subjective predilections that it has conceded it must avoid in con-
struing the Constitution. The Court has usually expressed this
objective standard by asking whether the interest for which con-
stitutional protection is sought is one recognized in our nation's
history and traditions,"' or is so fundamental that it can be said
to lie at the very foundation of our civil and political institu-
tions" such that ordered liberty can, scarcely be imagined were
it eliminated."'
The Supreme Court's substantive due process decisions sup-
port the inference that even when the Court has misread histo-
ry-as it did in Roe v. Wad" 9 -history nonetheless has remained
the guiding principle for determining whether a particular interest
115 Id. at 502.
116 Id. at 501-02 (the test is whether a particular interest is "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition") (plurality opinion).
117 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-28 (1937) (those rights are guaranteed
which are found among the "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at
the base of all our civil and political institutions" and which are "implicit" in the very
"concept of ordered liberty"); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (due
process protects those liberties "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965)
(the Court has "continual[ly] insist[ed] upon respect for the teachings of history [and]
solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society") (Harlan, J., concurring in
judgment); see also Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122-23.
118 Liberty extends to those interests that are "implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty," such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed." Palko, 302
U.S. at 325-26.
119 See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
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ranks as fundamental. Early in this century, the Supreme Court in
Meyer v. Nebraska' struck down a Nebraska law that forbade chil-
dren from being taught a foreign language. The Nebraska law, the
Court ruled, unreasonably infringed upon the liberty protected by
the Due Process Clause because it interfered with a student's right
to acquire knowledge, a teacher's right to engage in his or her
profession, and the parents' right to direct the upbringing and
education of their children. The Court relied upon our nation's
historic recognition of the value of education"' and the right
and duty of parents to educate their children.2  Later, in Pierce
v. Society of Sisters,12 1 the Court struck down an Oregon law that
forbade parents from sending their children to private schools. In
that case, the Court relied in part on the Meyer Court's recogni-
tion two years earlier of the parents' right to direct the upbring-
ing of their child.'24
From the outset, the identification of fundamental rights
seems to have been predicated on the Court's recognition that
certain personal relationships are so critical to how we order our-
selves as a society that they are entitled to a high level of protec-
tion from government interference. The Meyer and Pierce Courts,
for example, acted to protect the sanctity of the relationship be-
tween parent and child. The same relational principle was invoked
again in the Court's first contraception case, Griswold v. Connecti-
cut.
25
In that case, the Court relied upon the historic sanctity of the
marital relationship to overturn the conviction of a physician for
giving a married couple information and advice about contracep-
tives. The Connecticut law "operat[ed] directly on an intimate
relation of husband and wife,"'26 having "a maximum destructive
120 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
121 The Court cited the Ordinance of 1787 as support for the proposition that "[t]he
American people have always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters
of supreme importance which should be diligently promoted." Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400.
122 "[I]t is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education." Id.
123 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
124 While these two opinions rely more on a rational relation rather than a compel-
ling interest test, they nonetheless have come to stand for the protection of rights that
the Court has deemed fundamental and therefore entitled to greater scrutiny. E.g., Bow-
ers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-94 (1986).
125 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
126 Id. at 482. The Court did not rely strictly on the Due Process Clause, but upon
"the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." Id. at 485.
Among these guarantees were the freedom to educate one's children protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment, id. at 482, the right of association protected under the First
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impact" upon that relationship."' The Court asked rhetorically:
Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of
marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?
The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding
the marriage relationship.
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights - older than our political parties, older than our school
system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse,
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sa-
cred ... [I]t is an association for as noble a purpose as any
involved in our prior decisions.
28
In a concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg emphasized that the
Connecticut law threatened the marital or family relationship. The
law, he wrote, "disrupt[ed] the traditional relation of the family-a
relation as old and as fundamental as our entire civiliza-
tion . . . ."" Not all sexual relations were constitutionally pro-
tected, Justice Goldberg noted, but the conjugal relations of hus-
band and wife were.'
Reliance upon history and tradition has been equally disposi-
tive in identifying rights triggering heightened judicial scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause."' In Loving v. Virginia,
32
for example, in striking down a Virginia law that forbade inter-
Amendment, id. at 483, and the right to be free of governmental intrusion into the
home protected under the Third and Fourth Amendments. Id. at 484.
127 Id. at 485.
128 Id. at 485-86.
129 Id. at 486, 495-96 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
130 Justice Goldberg wrote:
Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the State for-
bids . . . but the intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an essential and
accepted feature of the institution of marriage, an institution which the State
not only must allow, but which always and in every age it has fostered and pro-
tected.
Id. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring), quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
131 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state
may "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. In general, the Equal Protection Clause prevents state legisla-
tures from treating different classes of people differently if there is no reasonable basis
for the classific~tion. For example, a state could not pass a law providing that only mar-
ried people could purchase eyeglasses because there would be no rational basis in such a
case for treating married and unmarried people differently. In general, the Court has
subjected laws involving racial classification, like the one in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967), to strict scrutiny.
132 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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racial marriages on equal protection and due process grounds, the
Court observed that "[t]he freedom to marry has long been recog-
nized as one of the vital personal fights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men."'33
Again, in Skinner v. Oklahoma,'34 the Court invalidated on
equal protection grounds an Oklahoma law that required habitual
criminals to be sterilized, stating: "We are dealing here with legis-
lation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival
of the [human] race."135
In 1972, a wrinkle appeared in the Supreme Court's substan-
tive due process jurisprudence. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,i"6 the Court
relied upon Griswold, a case based on the sanctity of the marital
relationship, to invalidate a Massachusetts law that made it a felo-
ny to distribute contraceptives to unmarried persons.1 37  The
Court concluded that the Massachusetts law violated the Equal
Protection Clause because the state had proffered no rational basis
for treating married and unmarried persons differently. In its
analysis, the Court fell back upon a more general characterization
of what it thought was at issue; namely, a right "to bear or beget a
child." "a
Moreover, the Court developed the issue without any inquiry
as to whether our history and traditions have recognized such a
right outside the marital relationship. Thus, the guiding concern
in the Court's substantive due process jurisprudence for protecting
certain relationships essential to ordered liberty was obscured in
Eisenstadt by the Court's willingness to protect individual decisions
about childbearing. Yet this protection was crafted without careful
regard for the changed factual context in which the affected right
was now asserted. 39 The subtle, unannounced shift in emphasis
133 Id. at 12.
134 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
135 Id. at 541.
136 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
137 The law did not prevent distribution of contraceptives to either unmarried or
married persons to prevent the spread of disease; it did so only to prevent pregnancy.
See id. at 442.
138 Id. at 453.
139 This shift from a decision made within the confines of a protected relationship
(as in Griswold) to one involving individualized decisions by a single person (as in
Eisenstadt) should not be passed over lightly. Griswold recognized that marriage is a pro-
tected relationship and sought to ensure that it would be up to a married couple to
decide whether to have children. Eisenstadt disregards the necessarily relational nature of
child-bearing decisions, placing a couple in separate decision-making compartments as
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was unaccompanied by any principled explanation of how, aside
from the lessons of history, the Court would determine for pur-
poses of future cases what types of personal decisions were entitled
to constitutional protection.
Supreme Court cases decided after Eisenstadt have continued
to insist that history is the operative principle for determining
whether an interest is a fundamental right. Only one year after
Eisenstadt, the Court issued its opinion in Roe v. Wade."4 Half of
the majority opinion in Roe is devoted to a review of ancient,
medieval and modem attitudes toward abortion. Based on this re-
view, a majority of the Court concluded that statutes banning
abortion were "of relatively recent vintage," deriving from "statuto-
ry changes effected, for the most part, in the latter half of the
19th century."'4' Although this version of history has been sound-
ly repudiated,"' the Court's extended treatment of history sug-
gests its continued reliance upon history in identifying those rights
which are entitled to heightened protection under the substantive
component of the Due Process Clause. To this day, history re-
though one could decide on his or her own whether to have children. Such a fiction
fails to recognize the natural sociality of human beings and leaves the individual isolated
in his or her privacy. See Jordan, supra note 30, at 132-33.
The Court, some have suggested, may have decided Eisenstadt in anticipation of Roe
v. Wade JOHN T. NOONAN, A PRIVATE CHOICE: ABORTION IN AMERICA IN THE SEVENTIES
21 (1979). That is a telling suggestion. While Roe purported not to leave a woman isolat-
ed in her privacy, 428 U.S. at 154, subsequent Supreme Court opinions drove a constitu-
tional wedge between the pregnant woman and her spouse, and between the pregnant
unmarried minor and her parents. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2826-32 (1992) (holding that a state constitutionally may not even condition the availabili-
ty of abortion upon spousal notification); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
69-75 (1976) (holding that a state constitutionally may not condition the availability of
abortion upon spousal or parental consent).
These unfortunate developments at least partly result from methodological errors. In
Eisenstadt, for example, it were as if the Court had asked what business the state had in
regulating the conduct at issue. The Court instead should have engaged in an historical
analysis of the relational interests implicated by that case, as it has in other cases. Cf
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123-27 (1989); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
192-95 (1986). Its failure to do so leaves it open to the charge that its jurisprudence has
to some extent been driven by the desired result of a particular case.
140 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
141 Id. at 129.
142 Id. See Robert A. Destro, Abortion and the Constitution: The Need for a Life Protective
Amendmen 63 CAL. L. REv. 1250, 1267-92 (1975); Joseph W. Dellapenna, The History of
Abortion: Technology, Morality and the Law, 40 U. Prrr. L. REv. 359, 379-89 (1979). See gen-
erally Dennis J. Horan & Thomas J. Balch, Roe v. Wade: No Justflcation in History, Law or
Logic, in ABORTION AND THE CONSTrr=tION 57 (Dennis J. Horan et al. eds., 1987); John
R. Connery, S.J., The Ancients and the Medievals on Abortion: The Consensus the Court Ignored,
in id. at 123; Martin Arbagi, Roe and the Hippocratic Oath, in id. at 159.
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mains one of two methodological principles grounding the Court's
substantive due process cases.
143
Proponents of a right to assisted suicide often cite Planned
Parenthood v. Casey to support their claim that the Supreme Court
no longer adheres to an historical test when considering substan-
tive due process claims.14 ' This contention is not supported by
the text of Casey or subsequent Supreme Court opinions. If the
Court in Casey had intended to craft an entirely new test for deter-
mining whether interests are protected by the substantive compo-
nent of the Due Process Clause, it surely would have announced
this intention. In fact, the principal opinion in Casey, offered by
assisted suicide advocates as the source of the putative new test,
itself continues to invoke tradition as the touchstone for determin-
ing whether an interest is entitled to substantive due process pro-
tection." Although the opinion notes that tradition is "living"
rather than static, is not susceptible to a simple formula, and that
judges should exercise "reasoned judgment, "" it leaves unaltered
the Court's framework for identifying substantive due process
rights. Moreover, the Court's reliance upon history and tradition
in substantive due process cases decided after Casey would defy
explanation if the Court had abandoned that test in Casey.47
143 See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2806 (quoting Justice Harlan for the observation that
while due process cannot be reduced to a formula, neither can it ignore "what history
teaches are the traditions from which [this country] developed as well as the traditions
from which it broke"); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121-23 (1989) (interests
for which substantive due process protection is sought must be "rooted in history and
tradition"); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) ("Our decisions
establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the
institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Supreme Court precedent reflects "continual
insistence upon respect for the teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic
values that underlie our society . . . ").
144 E.g., People v. Kevorkian, No. 93-11482, 1993 WL 603212, at *13 (Mich. Cir. Ct.
Dec. 13, 1993) (Kaufman, J.), rev'd sub nom. Hobbins v. Attorney Gen., 518 N.W.2d 487
(Mich. Ct. App. 1994), aff'd in part and rev'd in par People v. Kevorkian, Nos. 99591,
99674, 99752, 99758, 99759, 1994 WL 700448 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994) (consolidated cases).
145 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2806 (reiterating that the Court must construe the Due Pro-
cess Clause with "regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which [the na-
tion] developed as well as the traditions from which it broke"), quoting Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting from dismissal on jurisdictional grounds).
146 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2806 ("[t]radition is a living thing"), quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at
542 (Harlan, J., dissenting from dismissal on jurisdictional grounds). See also People v.
Kevorkian, Nos. 99591, 99674, 99752, 99758, 99759, 1994 WL 700448, at *12 (Mich. Dec.
13, 1994) ("[Wle must determine whether the asserted right to commit suicide arises
from a rational evolution of tradition or whether recognition of such a right would be a
radical departure from historical precepts.").
147 In Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993), Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices
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This, of course, is not to deny that one can find poetic lan-
guage about the beauty and nature of personal liberty in Supreme
Court opinions. For example, Justice Brandeis is often cited for his
statement in Olmstead v. United States4' that "the right to be let
alone" is the most cherished of personal liberties.' In Casey, 5'
as another example, the Court characterizes liberty in terms of
"intimate and personal choices," "personal dignity and autonomy,"
"one's own concept of existence," "the universe," and "the mystery
of human life."''
However majestic or inspiring such language may be, the
Court has not yet signalled a readiness to derive constitutional
rights out of such ethereal categories as "the mystery of human
life." If the Court invented new rights on such grounds, it would
no longer be interpreting a constitution. Rather, continued reli-
ance upon history and tradition prevents substantive due process
jurisprudence from becoming little more than the unrestrained
and subjective "predilections of those who happen at the time to
be Members of [the] Court."' Even those justices who have
been critical of the historical standard as itself lacking sufficient
objectivity have not offered a more objective alternative.'53
A second methodological feature of the Court's due process
jurisprudence is its recognition that interests for which heightened
constitutional protection is sought cannot be described merely at
the level of philosophic abstraction, but instead must be identified
with specificity and with an eye toward the factual context in
which that interest is asserted. In other words, whether a state can
constitutionally forbid or command certain conduct cannot be an-
Stevens and Souter, wrote:
So-called "substantive due process" prevents the government from engaging in
conduct that "shocks the conscience," Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172
(1952) [a case that relied upon the tests of tradition and ordered liberty], or
interferes with rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
Id. at 879 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (parallel citations omitted). See also Reno v. Flores,
113 S. Ct. 1439, 1447 (1993) (noting that the rights asserted by petitioners "cannot be
considered 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental'").
148 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
149 Id. at 478 (referring to the "right to be let alone" as "the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men").
150 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
151 Id. at 2807.
152 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977).
153 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 126 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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swered by merely formulating the conduct in its most abstract
terms. This becomes immediately apparent when one juxtaposes
the Court's various due process decisions.
For example, states may not forbid individuals of different
races from marrying,' but they can and obviously do prohibit
marriages between members of the same immediate family.'55
Likewise, a state may not prevent parents from sending their chil-
dren to private schools'56 or from providing them instruction in
a foreign language,5 7 but it can require that they attend school
and receive instruction in English.'58 Thus, whether interracial
and incestuous unions are protected liberties cannot be answered
merely by framing the conduct at issue as an exercise of the "right
to marry," just as the constitutionality of a law concerning educa-
don cannot be ascertained by merely invoking a parental right to
control the upbringing of one's child.
Individual justices have disagreed about the precise level of
specificity with which a particular interest must be
characterized,'59 but the impossibility of reconciling the Court's
various due process decisions based on mere recitation of such
abstract rights as the "right to marry" or "right to control the
154 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
155 52 AM. JUR. 2D Mariage §§ 62-63 (1970) (noting that the prohibition against mar-
riages between closely related persons is universal). The deleterious health consequences
of such unions is well known. See Consanguinity, 3 THE NEw ENCYCLOPEDIA BRrrANNICA
550 (1987).
156 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
157 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
158 Id. at 402 (dictum) ("The power of the State to compel attendance at some
school and to make reasonable regulations for all schools, including a requirement that
they shall give instructions in English, is not questioned."); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534 (dic-
tum) ("No question is raised concerning the power of the state reasonably to regulate all
schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require
that all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral
character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizen-
ship must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the pub-
lic welfare.").
159 Compare Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118-30 (1989) (Scalia, J.) (consid-
ering a father's interest in asserting parental rights over a child whose mother was at all
times married to another man) with id. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (stating
that "the Court has characterized relevant traditions protecting asserted rights at levels of
generality that might not be 'the most specific level' available," and that she would re-
frain from imposing a "single mode of historical analysis"), and with id. at 136 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (stating that fathers have a constitutionally protected interest in their rela-
tionship with their children). See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2805
(1992) (rejecting the view that due process "protects only those practices, defined at the
most specific level, that were protected against government interference ... when the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified").
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upbringing of one's child" demonstrates rather conclusively that
some degree of specificity in locating the precise interest under
consideration is necessary.
C. The Constitutional Status of Assisted Suicide
Since two levels of analysis have generally been used in decid-
ing substantive due process claims, whether suicide or assisted
suicide is a constitutional right depends upon the answers to two
questions: (1) is suicide a fundamental right entitled to height-
ened judicial scrutiny, and (2) if not, is it a liberty interest enti-
tled to lesser protection? We will treat these questions separately.
Suicide or assisted suicide is not a fundamental right warrant-
ing strict scrutiny unless it is recognized in our nation's history
and traditions, or is so fundamental as to lie at the very founda-
tion of our civil and political institutions such that ordered liberty
could scarcely be imagined were it eliminated. t6° Merely to state
the question is to answer it. One looks in vain for a national tradi-
tion of suicide or assisted suicide. Most Americans, we suspect,
would be quite shocked to find that liberty itself would be threat-
ened if they were to be restrained from killing themselves; the
tragic consequences of suicide for both the deceased and those
whose who survive him or her make the absurdity of such a prop-
osition painfully evident. The American legal system generally has
not recognized any claim that non-existence is preferable to
life, 6 ' and, having found no such right at all, it most certainly
has not found that such a right lies at the base of our civil and
political institutions or is rooted in our nation's history and tra-
ditions.
The most exhaustive historical and constitutional analysis of
suicide available, after reviewing societal attitudes about suicide for
the last two millennia, concludes:
[T]here is no significant support for the claim that a right to
160 See supra Part III.B.
161 See, e.g., Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 548 (Ala. 1978) ('[Tihere is no legal
right not to be born .... Upon what legal foundation is the court to determine that it
is better not to have been born than to be born with deformities? . . .We decline to
pronounce judgment in the imponderable area of nonexistence"); Lininger v. Eisenbaum,
764 P.2d 1202, 1212 (Colo. 1988) ("[L]ife, however impaired and regardless of any atten-
dant expenses, cannot rationally be said to be a detriment .. . when measured against
the alternative of ... not having existed at all."); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528,
534 (N.C. 1985) ('[We are unwilling to say that life, even life with severe defects, may
ever amount to a legal injury."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 835 (1986).
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suicide is so rooted in our tradition that it may be deemed
"fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
Indeed, the weight of authority in the United States, from
colonial days through at least the 1970s has demonstrated that
the predominant attitude of society and the law has been one
of opposition to suicide. It follows that courts should not hold
suicide or its assistance to be a protected right under the Unit-
ed States Constitution.62
Relying in part on this irnportant study, Justice Scalia, in Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health,163 stated unequivocally that a right to
suicide could not "possibly be established" on the record of that
case:
At common law in England, a suicide . . .was criminally liable.
Although the States abolished the penalties imposed by the
common law (i.e., forfeiture and ignominious burial), they did
so to spare the innocent family and not to legitimize the act.
Case law at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment generally held that assisting suicide was a criminal of-
fense. The System of Penal Law presented to the House of
Representatives by Representative Livingston in 1828 would
have criminalized assisted suicide. The Field Penal Code, adopt-
ed by the Dakota Territory in 1877, proscribed attempted sui-
cide and assisted suicide. And most States that did not explicit-
ly prohibit assisted suicide in 1868 recognized, when the issue
arose in the 50 years following the Fourteenth Amendment's
ratification, that assisted and (in some cases) attempted suicide
were unlawful. Thus, there is no significant support for the
claim that a right to suicide is so rooted in our tradition that it
may be deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.""64
Two courts confronted directly with the claim that assisted
suicide has constitutional status-the Michigan Supreme Court in
People v. Kevorkian,t  and the United States District Court for the
162 Marzen et al., supra note 34, at 100. Constitutional scholar Yale Kamisar has re-
ferred to the Marzen article as "the most comprehensive and most heavily documented
law review article ever written on the subject" of suicide from a constitutional standpoint.
Yale Kamisar, Are Laws Against Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional?, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
May-June 1993, at 32.
163 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
164 Id. at 294-95 (citations and internal punctuation omitted).
165 People v. Kevorkian, Nos. 99591, 99674, 99752, 99758, 99759, 1994 WL 700448
(Mich. Dec. 13, 1994) (five consolidated appeals).
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Southern District of New York in Quill v. Koppell---have con-
cluded, independent of each other, that there is no historical sup-
port for a right to suicide or assisted suicide. Their separate analy-
ses of the historical record substantially parallel each other. In
both opinions, each court observes that suicide was a crime under
the common law punishable by forfeiture of property and igno-
minious burial. 7 Eventually, these penalties were abandoned "to
spare the innocent family and not to legitimize the act." "6e Most
states today make assisted suicide a crime, as did the majority of
states existing at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratifica-
tion." The Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute
likewise provides that assisting a suicide is a crime. 70
On this basis, Michigan's highest court concluded that "[ilt
would be an impermissibly radical departure from existing tradi-
tion, and from the principles that underlie that tradition, to de-
clare that there is . . . a fundamental right [to commit suicide]
protected by the Due Process Clause.""' In Quill, Chief Judge
Griesa pointedly observes that assisted suicide advocates in that
case "have pointed to nothing in the historical record to indicate
that... assisted suicide has been given any kind of sanction in
our legal history which would help establish it as a constitutional
right."
1 72
If suicide or assisted suicide is not a fundamental right, then
the first question is settled, and a law prohibiting assisted suicide
would not be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. The next
question is whether such a ban impinges on a liberty interest and
is therefore subject to some less rigorous level of judicial review.
Kevorkian and Quill both seem to conflate these two questions into
one.' 3 Each court, upon concluding that suicide is not a funda-
166 No. 94 Civ. 5321, 1994 WL 702800 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1994).
167 Kevorkian, 1994 WL 700448, at *13 n.49; QuilW4 1994 WL 702800, at *7.
168 Quil 1994 WL 702800, at *7 (quoting Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 294 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring)); see Kevorkian, 1994 WL 700448, at *13 (lawmakers "recognized the futility of pun-
ishment and the harshness of property forfeiture").
169 Kevorkian, 1994 WL 700448, at *13.
170 Id.; Quill 1994 WL 702800, at *7.
171 Kevorkian, 1994 WL 700448, at *14.
172 Qui!, 1994 WL 702800, at *7 (emphasis added).
173 See Kevorkian, 1994 WL 700448, at *8 (advocates of assisted suicide "argue that the
right to end one's own life is a fundamental liberty interest"); id. at *9 (the theories ad-
vanced by plaintiffs "assume a fundamental liberty interest in suicide"); id. at *12 (Cruzan
"does not portend that the United States Supreme Court would find a fundamental liber-
ty interest in suicide, let alone assisted suicide"); Qui/l 1994 WL 702800, at *7 (holding
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mental right, ends its analysis.14 Nevertheless, while not separate-
ly setting out the question about liberty interests, both decisions
articulate reasons why suicide is not a liberty interest. They do so
by distinguishing Case and Cruzan.
Both Quill and Kevorkian recognize that Casey does not sup-
port a constitutional right to suicide. As Judge Griesa notes, "[tlhe
Supreme Court has been careful to explain that the abortion
cases, and other related decisions on procreation and child rear-
ing, are not intended to lead automatically to the recognition of
other fundamental rights on different subjects."175 The Michigan
Supreme Court makes the additional observation that the United
States Supreme Court in Casey "was not directly concerned with
the establishment of a new right, but rather with whether the
Court should retreat from the right previously recognized in Roe v.
Wade.' 76
Nor does Cruzan support a constitutional right to suicide. In
that case, the Supreme Court concluded that a state may require
clear and convincing proof of the wishes of a patient in a persis-
tent vegetative state before discontinuing artificially provided nutri-
tion and hydration. 7  As recognized in Quill and Kevorkian,78
Cruzan merely assumed, but did not actually hold, that the discon-
tinuation of such treatment was a liberty interest.7 9 Having made
that assumption, the Supreme Court in Cruzan upheld the state's
interest in preserving the patient's life."' In any event, there is a
difference between declining medical treatment and committing
suicide. 8 The court in Kevorkian elaborates on this important
distinction:
[W]hereas suicide involves an affirmative act to end a life, the
that physician assisted suicide "does not involve a fundamental liberty interest protected
by the Due Process Clause").
174 Kevorkian, 1994 WL 700448, at *14; Quill, 1994 WL 702800, at *7.
175 Quill, 1994 WL 702800, at *6 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191
(1986), Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 & n.15 (1973)).
176 Kevorkian, 1994 WL 700448, at *12.
177 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 110, 261 (1990).
178 Kevorkian, 1994 WL 700448, at *9; Quill, 1994 WL 702800, at *6.
179 Cruzan, 497 at 279. Four justices assumed it was a liberty interest. Id. at 279. A
fifth justice asserted that it was. Id. at 287 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
180 Id. at 279.
181 Kevorkian, 1994 WL 700448, at *11 (distinguishing Cruzan and recognizing a dis-
tinction between the omission of medical treatment and an affirmative act of suicide);
Quill, 1994 WL 702800, at *6 ("suicide has a sufficiently different legal significance from




refusal or cessation of life-sustaining medical treatment simply
permits life to run its course, unencumbered by contrived in-
tervention. Put another way, suicide frustrates the natural
course by introducing an outside agent to accelerate death,
whereas the refusal or withdrawal of life-sustaining medical
treatment allows nature to proceed, i.e., death occurs because
of the underlying condition.
.... There is a difference between choosing a natural death
summoned by an uninvited illness or calamity, and deliberately
seeking to terminate one's life by resorting to death-inducing
measures unrelated to the natural process of dying. 82
To this, one might add the observations of the New York State
Task Force on Life and the Law:
As... courts have recognized, the fact that the refusal of
treatment and suicide may both lead to death does not mean
that they implicate identical constitutional concerns. The impo-
sition of life-sustaining medical treatment against a patient's will
requires a direct invasion of bodily integrity and, in some cases,
the use of physical restraints, both of which are flatly incon-
sistent with society's basic conception of personal dignity ....
It is this right against intrusion - not a general right to con-
trol the timing and manner of death - that forms the basis of
the constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. Re-
strictions on suicide, by contrast, entail no such intrusion, but
simply prevent individuals from intervening in the natural pro-
cess of dying.s8
182 Kevorian, 1994 WL 700448, at *11.
183 WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT, supra note 34, at 71. The American Medical Association
also recognizes a "fundamental difference between refusing life-sustaining treatment and
demanding a life-ending treatment." AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Report
No. 1-93-8, at 2. The Council writes:
When a life-sustaining treatment is declined, the patient dies primarily because
of an underlying disease. The illness is simply allowed to take its course. With
assisted suicide, however, death is hastened by the taking of a lethal drug or
other agent. Although a physician cannot force a patient to accept a treatment
against the patient's will, even if the treatment is life-sustaining, it does not
follow that a physician ought to provide a lethal agent to the patient. The in-
ability of physicians to prevent death does not imply that physicians are free to
help cause death.
Id. This view is consistent with a survey of hospital physicians and nurses showing 87% in
agreement with the statement that "to allow patients to die by foregoing or stopping
treatment is ethically different from assisting in their suicide." Solomon et al., Decisions
Near the End of Life: Professional Views on Life-Sustaining Treatmen 83 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
14, 17 (Jan. 1993).
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The origin of the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment
illustrates how different it is from an affirmative act of homicide
or suicide. The right to refuse medical treatment is rooted in the
common law right to be free of unwanted bodily contact, and
even that right is not absolute."' By contrast, the common law
has never recognized a right deliberately to take one's own life or
to have one's life taken by others. Indeed, the Due Process
Clause, which is framed as a, guarantee against the deprivation of
life as well as liberty, would be turned on its head were it con-
strued to require the state to permit an individual to abandon his
or her life and liberty. The law has never required the state to
permit an individual completely to relinquish such interests even if
that is what the individual wanted.
American law, for example, does not recognize under any
circumstances a transaction to sell oneself into involuntary servi-
tude."s A host of far less serious interests, and even statutory in-
terests like the right to be paid a minimum wage, are
nonwaivable. 6 Similarly, the law will not enforce an unconscio-
nable bargain or a contract that violates public policy, even if the
parties freely agreed to it.i"7 If the law can prohibit waiver of
these lesser interests, it would be inexplicable if the state were
constitutionally required to stand idle while an individual, alone or
with assistance, renounced the one interest upon which all others
depend. Finding a liberty interest in deliberately taking one's own
life, or in having another person's assistance in committing sui-
cide, undermines both the Constitution's explicit protection of life
184 The government, for example, may compel vaccinations over an individual's objec-
tions. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
154 (1973) (noting that the Court has refused to recognize "an unlimited right to do
with one's body as one pleases").
185 City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 120 (1981) (The Thirteenth Amend-
ment "is not a mere prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an
absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the
United States" (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883))).
186 Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706-07 (1945) (minimum wage and
overtime protections are non-waivable).
187 E.g., Freedman Truck Ctr., Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 784 F. Supp. 167, 178
(D.N.J. 1992) (observing that a "contract may be set aside where its purpose is contrary
to the common good or . . . contains unconscionable terms"); American Home Assur-
ance Co. v. Cohen, 815 F. Supp. 365, 370 (W.D. Wash. 1993) (noting that a court will
not enforce contracts that "tend clearly to injure the public health, the public morals,
the public confidence in the purity of the administration of the law, or to undermine
that sense of security for individual rights, whether of personal liberty or of private prop-




and the traditional recognition that other, lesser interests cannot
be waived.
An analysis of two recent trial court decisions finding a consti-
tutional right to assisted suicide further illustrates the jurispruden-
tial errors in such a theory. The first decision, People v.
KevorkianI'--later reversed on appeal'89-- invalidated Michigan's
statutory ban on assisted suicide. The trial judge in Kevorkian held
that the Michigan statute, in violation of the United States Con-
stitution, infringes upon the liberty of persons who decide to com-
mit a "rational" suicide because such an action is "an intimate and
personal choice" which is "implicated in the concept of ordered
liberty."9 '
The second decision, Compassion in Dying v. Washington,'91
issued by a federal district judge sitting in Seattle, held that the
State of Washington cannot constitutionally prohibit mentally com-
petent, terminally ill persons from obtaining a physician's assis-
tance in committing suicide provided they act knowingly, voluntari-
ly, and without undue influence. The two decisions together pro-
vide a springboard for studying the jurisprudential errors to be
avoided in considering whether assisted suicide is a fundamental
or otherwise constitutionally protected right.
1. The Kevorkian Case
Retired pathologist Jack Kevorkian, after highly publicized
incidents in which he admitted to using a homemade suicide
machine to help several people kill themselves, was charged in
Wayne County Circuit Court with violation of the Michigan law
that makes it a felony to assist another person in committing sui-
cide.' Kevorkian claimed that the law violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving persons of the
fundamental right to end their lives.
188 People v. Kevorkian, No. 93-11482, 1993 WL 603212 at *20 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Dec.
13, 1993) (Kaufman, J.), reu'd sub noma. Hobbins v. Attorney Gen., 518 N.W.2d 487 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1994), affd in part and reu'd in part, People v. Kevorkian, Nos. 99591, 99674,
99752, 99758, 99759, 1994 WL 700448 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994) (consolidated cases).
189. See Hobbins v. Attorney Gen., 518 N.W.2d 487 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994), aFfid in part
and rev'd in parn People v. Kevorkian, Nos. 99591, 99674, 99752, 99758, 99759, 1994 WL
700448 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994) (consolidated cases).
190 Kevorkian, 1993 WL 603212, at *14.
191 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), appeal
docketed, No. 94-35534 (9th Cir. June 3, 1994).
192 See MICH. CoMp. LAws § 752.1027 (1993).
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The trial court found "significant support in our traditions
and history for the view approving suicide or attempted suicide,"
but concluded that the historical record was too "murky" to pro-
vide sufficient grounds for disposing of Kevorkian's constitutional
claim. 9  Like the decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
child rearing, and abortion, the decision to take one's own life
was "an intimate and personal choice," '94 a "deeply personal deci-
sion of obvious and overwhelming finality."'95 For these reasons,
the court concluded that "the decision to commit suicide, at least
under some circumstances, can be deemed to be implicated in the
concept of ordered liberty."'95
The trial court acknowledged that the state has a legitimate
interest in preserving life. Indeed, the state's interest is "certainly a
sufficient justification for the state to proscribe attempted suicide
under many, if not most, circumstances."9' There were other circum-
stances, however, when "all reasonably objective observers would,
at a minimum, sympathize with [the] person's desire to end [his
or her] life."9 8 Quoting extensively from a single article by a
proponent of assisted suicide, the court concluded that in some
cases, suicide is "rational."" A suicide, the court elaborated, was
"rational" whenever all of the following factors were present:
[A] person's quality of life is significantly impaired by a medi-
cal condition and the medical condition is extremely unlikely
to improve, and that person's decision to commit suicide is a
reasonable response to the condition causing the quality of life
to be significantly impaired, and the decision to end one's life
is freely made without undue influence."°
The Michigan law, the court concluded, violated the Due Process
Clause because it banned even such "rational" suicides.
193 Kevorkian, 1993 WL 603212, at *13 ("An appeal to history and tradition . . . can-
not determine the result of this constitutional question").
194 Id. at *13 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992)).
195 Id. at *14 (quoting Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281
(1990)).
196 Id. at *14.
197 Id. (emphasis added).
198 Id.
199 Id. at *16-17 (quoting Richard B. Brandt, The Rationality of Suicide, in SUICIDE:
THE PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES 117-32 (M. Pabst Battin & David J. Mayo eds., 1980)).
200 Kevorkian, 1993 WL 603212, at *19. This definition of "rational suicide" is tautolo-
gous because it defines that notion in terms of a response to a medical condition which
must in turn be "reasonable."
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(a) Failure To Recognize And Defer To Our Nation's History And
Traditions.-The first sign that the trial court in Kevorkian substitut-
ed personal for constitutional notions of liberty is its departure
from history. History and tradition, the court wrote, were only one
test of the scope of the Due Process Clause. The other test was
whether the claimed right was "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty." Each test, the Michigan court concluded, was related to
each other, but "distinct.""' The United States Supreme Court,
however, has never held that historical grounding and "implic-
it[ness] in the concept of ordered liberty" are severable require-
ments. On the contrary, the Court has "insisted not merely that
the interest denominated as a 'liberty' be 'fundamental' (a con-
cept that, in isolation, is hard to objectify), but also that it be an
interest traditionally protected-by our society." 2 '
Indeed, it is difficult to understand how these requirements
could be severed. How can an interest be "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty" if it has no basis in our institutions and tradi-"
tions? Whether a claimed right is implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty is not an alternative vehicle for finding it to be pro-
tected under the Due Process Clause when the history and tradi-
tions of our nation otherwise accord it no protection or recogni-
tion. Rather, that a right must be fundamental, at the base of our
political and social institutions, or implicit in the very concept of
ordered liberty are further qualifications as to which rights within
our nation's history and tradition are considered to be so vital as
to be assured protection under the Constitution.
The dangerous consequence of severing "ordered liberty"
from history is evident when one considers the balance of the
Michigan trial court's analysis. The court cast aside the fact that
suicide has long been prohibited under both American and Eng-
lish common and statutory law, turning instead to one particular
(and skewed) reading of ancient and medieval attitudes toward
suicide. On the basis of the historical account of a single author
sympathetic to assisted suicide, the trial court concludes that in
201 Id. at *8.
202 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (plurality opinion). See also
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) ("Appropriate limits on substan-
tive due process come not from drawing arbitrary lines but rather from careful 'respect
for the teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our
society.'").
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many circumstances suicide was acceptable in ancient Greek and
Roman society and was not always condemned by the early Chris-
tian church."3 This reading of history is highly misleading. An-
cient attitudes to suicide appear not to have been uniform, but
there certainly is a tradition within Greek and Roman thought
which condemned the practice."0 4  Likewise, Christianity has
steadily condemned suicide. 5
Even if the court had accurately interpreted the historical
record, its decision would remain methodologically flawed. First, a
constitutionally protected right surely cannot encompass conduct
expressly prohibited throughout our nation's history. Protection of a
particular interest "need not take the form of an explicit constitu-
tional provision or statutory guarantee [to warrant protection un-
der the Due Process Clause] but it must at least exclude ... a
societal tradition of enacting laws denying that interest."20  A
court can hardly be charged with deferring to history and tradi-
tion when it elevates conduct that has been long condemned
under our laws to the status of a constitutional right.
207
Second, to identify an interest as a fundamental right because
it may have been practiced in some parts of the ancient world,
particularly when the same practice has been steadily condemned
throughout our own nation's history, disregards our specifically
American traditions and institutions. No one would seriously con-
tend that parents can slaughter their children if weak or de-
formed, but the practice existed in ancient Greece. In some re-
gions of Greece, a father could "expose his children on the moun-
203 Kevorkian, 1993 WL 603212, at *11.
204 Marzen et al., supra note 34, at 20-26.
205 Darrel W. Amundsen, Suicide and Early Christian Values, in SUICIDE AND EUTHANA-
SIA: HiSTOICAL AND CONTEMPORARY THEMEs 77-153 (Baruch A. Brody ed., 1989).
206 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123 n.2; see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-95
(1986) (in light of longstanding proscriptions against homosexual sodomy, any claim that
"such conduct is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' or 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty' is, at best, facetious").
207 Laws requiring racial discrimination are a notable exception. The Fourteenth
Amendment was enacted with the specific intent of uprooting racial discrimination. Such
discrimination had become endemic in our nation's laws and traditions, so clearly the
fact that some laws which furthered racial discrimination were on the books would not
prevent one from finding such laws unconstitutional. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1967). The practice of slavery and racial discrimination are precisely examples of "tra-
ditions from which [our nation] . . . broke." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791, 2806 (1992) (quoting Justice Harlan). In Loving, the Court again grounded its
decision in history when it observed that the freedom to marry "has long been recog-
nized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men." Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
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taintops to die, or slaughter them on the altars of the thirsty
gods.""! In Sparta, a child "that appeared defective was thrown
from a cliff .... .2 " The existence of such a practice in antiqui-
ty obviously does not establish infanticide as a constitutional right.
Indeed, the Court has rejected ancient attitudes when based on
ideas that are inconsistent with those upon which our institutions
rest.210
The Michigan court's reliance upon Cruzan to find that sui-
cide is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty is especially mis-
placed. Cruzan concluded that a state may require clear and
convincing proof of the wishes of a patient in a persistent vegeta-
tive state before discontinuing artificially provided nutrition and
hydration. 212 The Court assumed only for the sake of disposing
of that case that the discontinuation of such treatment was a liber-
ty interest.2" Cruzan is distinguishable from the Kevorkian case
because the Cruzan court (a) involved the discontinuation of an
allegedly intrusive and burdensome treatment, (b) upheld the
state's interest in preserving the patient's life, and (c) assumed
that discontinuation of treatment was at most a liberty interest,
not a fundamental right.2 4
It is also not clear what standard of judicial review the Mich-
igan court actually applied in Kevorkian. At one stage, the court
couches the issue in terms of fundamental rights,215 and the
court in fact uses the compelling interest test in concluding that a
state could constitutionally enact a law outlawing suicide where no
underlying objective illness was present.21 At another stage of its
analysis, however, the Michigan court, citing Cruzan, indicates that
the state's interest in preserving life must "be weighed against the
208 Wni. DURANT, THE LIFE OF GREECE 50 (1939).
209 Id. at 81.
210 Ancient Greek notions of child rearing, for example, were based on ideas about
the relation between the individual and state which are "wholly different from those
upon which our institutions rest," and no legislature could impose comparable restrictions
upon our people "without doing violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitution."
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923).
211 People v. Kevorkian, No. 93-11482, 1993 WL 603212 at *14 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Dec.
13, 1993) (Kaufman, J.), reu'd sub noma. Hobbins v. Attorney Gen., 518 N.W.2d 487 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1994), affd in part and rev'd in part, People v. Kevorkian, Nos. 99591, 99674,
99752, 99758, 99759, 1994 WL 700448 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994) (consolidated cases).
212 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 284 (1990).
213 Id. at 279.
214 Id. at 279, 287.
215 Kevorkian, 1993 WL 603212, at *13.
216 Id. at *18.
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constitutionally protected interests of the individual."2 7 Finally,
the court invokes Casey to determine whether a blanket proscrip-
tion on assisted suicide would "unduly burden" a person's right to
commit assisted suicide."' These are different standards of re-
view, yet the Michigan court fails to adhere to or justify its selec-
tion of any single standard.
The fog thickens when the trial court attempts to apply these
standards to the facts. In particular, the court's conclusion that
rational suicide is constitutionally protected appears to be based on
an incorrect application of the rational relation test. The court
concludes that the act of suicide (a) can sometimes be rational,
(b) is a personal act, and therefore (c) is, whenever rational, enti-
fled to constitutional protection. This reasoning ignores the real
evidence which belies such a conclusion. 9
Moreover, traditional judicial review requires a court to deter-
mine whether the challenged law bears a rational relationship to a
legitimate state objective, not whether the individual's conduct is
rational under particular circumstances. Otherwise, any reasonable
act, provided it could be characterized as "personal" or "intimate,"
would be beyond the state's power to regulate. In such a bizarre
world, laws would be felled right and left by the constitutional axe
upon a simple articulation of some rational basis for engaging in
prohibited activity, activity that few would dispute is within the
authority of state legislatures to regulate and even to proscribe.
Thus, the Michigan court's error leaves great room for mischief.
For if conduct need only be personal and rational to qualify for
constitutional protection, then vast areas of private conduct will lie
beyond the scope of legislation-all by virtue of a judicial inter-
pretation that increasingly loses sight of the "order" in "ordered
liberty.""2
217 Id. at *14.
218 Id. at *19.
219 See supra Part II.B.
220 The court's conclusion that the state's interest in preserving life has a "qualitative
component" that must take account of the rationality or irrationality of the particular
suicide is also ill-founded. The Michigan court cites Cruzan and Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S.
200 (1927). Cruzan held that states may assert an unqualified interest in preserving life,
so it supports a conclusion opposite to that reached by the court. Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990) ("[W]e think a State may properly de-
cline to make judgments about the 'quality' of life that a particular individual may enjoy,
and simply assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life to be weighed
against the constitutionally protected interests of the individual."). Buck upheld the forced
sterilization of retarded persons and is now universally discredited.
[Vol. 70:3
ASSISTED SUICIDE
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the
trial court. Recognizing that certain activities relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child bearing
have been accorded due process protection, the intermediate
appellate court concluded that a right to terminate one's life is
not a logical extension of this catalog of rights. The Michigan
Supreme Court agreed. "It would be an impermissibly radical
departure from existing tradition," the Supreme Court wrote, "and
from the principles that underlie that tradition, to declare that
there is ... a fundamental right [to suicide] protected by the
Due Process Clause."
22'
(b) Failure To Identify With Specificity The Interest For Which
Constitutional Protection is Sought.-The Michigan trial court also
erred in ranking assisted suicide as a fundamental right merely
because of the personal nature of a decision to commit suicide.
When it finally came time to state precisely why "rational" suicide
is a "right," the court wrote:
[T]here can be little doubt that the decision to commit suicide
involves an intimate and personal choice, and given the nature
of the decision certainly ranks among the most important that
a person may make concerning one's own being. As succinctly
put by the Court in Cruzan, . . . the choice between life and
death is a deeply personal decision of obvious and overwhelm-
ing finality. In this Court's view, therefore, the decision to
commit suicide, at least under some circumstances, can be
deemed to be implicated in the concept of ordered liberty.'
The fact that a choice is "intimate and personal" is not a princi-
pled reason for concluding that it is a constitutionally protected
liberty. One must look to the specific conduct at issue. Presum-
ably, the decision to engage in a duel or marry a sibling is inti-
mate and personal. Yet there is no constitutional right to engage
in such conduct.2' Thus, the fact that a decision may be inti-
mate and personal is hardly grounds for holding that it is a consti-
tutionally protected right.
(c) The Tendency To Legislate.-The Michigan trial court corn-
221 People v. Kevorkian, Nos. 99591, 99674, 99752, 99758, 99759, 1994 WL 700448, at
*14 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994).
222 Kevorkian, 1993 WL 603212, at *14.
223 See supra Part IIIj4_
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mits a third jurisprudential error. In deciding when suicide is
"rational" and when it is not, the court makes the sort of fine-
tuned distinctions that are more characteristic of a legislature than
a court. The court reaches the rather difficult-to-parse conclusion
that
when a person's quality of life is significantly impaired by a
medical condition and the medical condition is extremely un-
likely to improve, and that person's decision to commit suicide
is a reasonable response to the condition causing the quality of
life to be significantly impaired, and the decision to end one's
life is freely made without undue influence, such a person has
a constitutionally protected right to commit suicide. 4
Of course, whether and when these conditions are ever pres-
ent requires the type of inquiry that counsels against any legislative
judgment to permit suicide. One need only note, for example,
that enforcing the court's decision requires one to define such
terms as "significantly impaired," "extremely unlikely to improve,"
"reasonable response," "quality of life," "significant impairment,"
and "undue influence." In essence, the court's holding calls for
line-drawing as complex as any statute or regulation, a tell-tale sign
that the court has left the province of the judiciary and entered
the province of the legislature."' Does the Due Process Clause, a
provision itself cast in highly general terms, really mandate such
fine-tuned distinctions when a state decides to prevent suicide?
Moreover, if the fact that a choice is "intimate and personal"
is enough to guarantee its protection under the Due Process
Clause, one wonders why the intimate and personal decision to
commit suicide in principle should be limited only to those cases
where all of the cited conditions are present. A decision to com-
mit suicide because of a business failing or family tragedy seems
just as intimate and personal as a decision to commit suicide
based on other reasons or no reason.
Nor is there any principled way to limit the exercise of a
judicially announced right to suicide only to those conditions
specified in the trial court's opinion.226 As we have seen, judicial
224 Kevorkian, 1993 WL 603212, at *19 (emphasis added).
225 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2860 (1992) (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("We believe that the sort of constitution-
ally imposed abortion code of the type illustrated by our decisions following Roe is incon-
sistent with the notion of a Constitution cast in general terms, as ours is, and usually
speaking in general principles, as ours does.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
226 See, e.g., Kevorkian, 1994 WL 700448, at *39 n.41 (holding that there is no right
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rules tend to expand to (and even beyond) the limits of their own
logic.22 Parallels to federal and state court abortion decisions are
especially apposite.
Beginning in Roe, the Supreme Court announced a rule that
it claimed was not absolute. A woman, it insisted, was not isolated
in her privacy. 8 The Court then proceeded in subsequent deci-
sions to make the abortion decision precisely all it had disclaimed.
Thus, no person, not even the father of the woman's child, could
prevent the child's destruction; nor could the state even require
that the mother consult with the child's father before having the
abortion.2" The state was also proscribed from providing the
woman with information about her unborn child that might tend
to encourage childbirth rather than abortionY The slippery
slope continued: if adult women had the right, so did minors."
If women and minors had the right, so did incompetents. 2 One
state court has even held that the right to destroy fertilized embry-
os outside the uterus resides with the father seeking their destruc-
tion; in other words, when the mother wants to preserve her fertil-
ized extra-uterine eggs, the father can compel their destruc-
tion.' What began as a right to control one's "intimate and per-
sonal choices" with respect to abortion has expanded (or deterio-
rated) into an ethos in which any person's decision to destroy or
take life trumps all other interests.
2. The Compassion In Dying Case
(a) Likening Suicide To Abortion.-Similar jurisprudential errors
mark a federal district court's decision on Washington's criminal
to suicide, and noting that "there would be no principled basis for restricting a right to
commit suicide to the terminally ill").
227 The experience in the Netherlands attests to the reality of the slippery slope. See
Hentoff, supra note 85. For an analogous discussion of the slippery slope in the abortion
context, see generally Chopko, supra note 86.
228 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973).
229 See, e.g., Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2791 (state may not require a woman seeking an
abortion to notify her husband); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)
(state may not require a woman seeking an abortion to obtain the consent of her
husband).
230 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1986), overruled in part by Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2868.
231 See generally Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); H. L. v. Matheson, 450
U.S. 398 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
232 See Larry Lange, Judge Approves Abortion for Retarded Rape Victim, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENcER, Dec. 1, 1993, at Al.
233 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. CL 1259 (1993).
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ban on assisted suicide. The court in Compassion in Dying v. Wash-
ington 34 held that the State of Washington could not legally bar
competent, terminally ill adults from obtaining assistance in com-
mitting suicide." The decision is distinguishable in some ways
from the trial court decision in Kevorkian because the court re-
stricts its due process analysis to a consideration of whether assist-
ed suicide is a liberty interest.3 ' Thus, the court does not in-
quire whether suicide is a fundamental right, and engages in no
historical analysis of the asserted interest in taking one's own life.
Nevertheless, like the trial court in Kevorkian, the court in
Compassion in Dying concludes that because the decision to commit
suicide involves "the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime," that choice is a liberty interest." The
court relies heavily on Casey, which is not particularly helpful pre-
cedent because it depended so heavily upon stare decisis. As noted
earlier, seven justices believe that Roe was either incorrectly decid-
ed or have sufficient doubt about its correctness to refrain from
affirming it on its original grounds."a Thus, the abortion right,
standing as it does on tenuous grounds, is hardly persuasive prece-
dent for the identification of other interests for which expecta-
tions have not already become settled."9
Likewise, the trial court's application of the undue burden
standard-the standard that a plurality now applies to abortion-is
difficult to square with Cruzan. Refusing life-sustaining treatment is
different than suicide,2" but suicide and refusing treatment seem
to bear greater resemblance to each other than suicide does to
abortion. Yet in Cruzan the Court did not apply the undue burden
standard. It applied a balancing test.24' Why the district court in
Compassion in Dying decided upon the undue burden standard,
and not the balancing test used in Cruzan, is even more puzzling
given the fact that the district court, for purposes of its constitu-
234 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), appeal docketed No. 94-35534 (9th Cir. June
3, 1994).
235 Id. at 1462.
236 Id. at 1459-62.
237 Id. at 1459-60, 1462.
238 See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
239 See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
240 See supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
241 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) ("whether ...
[Nancy Cruzan's] constitutional rights have been violated must be determined by balanc-
ing ... [her] liberty interests against the relevant state interests" (quoting Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982)).
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tional analysis, elsewhere finds no constitutionally relevant distinc-
tion between refusal of treatment and suicide.242
Any claimed similarity between suicide and abortion merely
underscores the fact that the Supreme Court has never adequately
explained why the Constitution would ban any law prohibiting the
taking of any human life. That the Supreme Court has erected
such a constitutional barrier for unborn children is not a justifica-
tion for now extending the barrier to the terminally ill. It is espe-
cially unpersuasive given the Supreme Court's inclination to de-
fend Roe on grounds of stare decisis rather than upon any principle
of constitutional adjudication.
In any event, to deny that there is any constitutionally permissi-
ble distinction between abortion and suicide is astonishing and
wrong. Suicide alone amounts to a complete and irrevocable re-
nunciation of the agent's life and liberty. Indeed, apart from the
fact that it is a personal decision of grave importance, the district
court in Compassion in Dying simply fails to articulate any grounds
for likening suicide to abortion. Yet, if a decision need only be
"personal" to qualify as a liberty interest, then the number of in-
terests entitled to constitutional protection (and thus beyond the
scope of state regulation) would be large indeed. The decision to
use a hallucinogenic drug or engage in any number of other
equally personal activities is subject to regulation and, in some
cases, an outright ban depending on the precise nature of the
activity. The personal nature of suicide proves nothing because it
proves too much.
(b) The Distinction Between Suicide And Refusing Medical
Treatment.-Compassion in Dying turns Cruzan on its head. After ac-
knowledging Cruzan's assumption that a competent person has a
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment,
the district court in Compassion in Dying goes on to conclude that
(a) the Supreme Court would, if confronted with the issue, decide
that refusing unwanted medical treatment is a liberty interest, and
(b) there is no constitutional basis for distinguishing between re-
fusing unwanted medical treatment and suicide.243 The latter
conclusion is expressed in no more than a single paragraph. The
court writes:
242 Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1461.
243 Id.
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The liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment is
the freedom to make choices according to one's individual
conscience about those matters which are essential to personal
autonomy and basic human dignity. There is no more pro-
foundly personal decision, nor one which is closer to the heart
of personal liberty, than the choice which a terminally ill per-
son makes to end his or her suffering and hasten an inevitable
death. From a constitutional perspective, the court does not
believe that a distinction can be drawn between refusing life-
sustaining medical treatment and physician-assisted suicide by
an uncoerced, mentally competent, terminally ill adult.244
The personal nature of suicide therefore forms the basis of
the court's conclusion not only that suicide is a protected liberty
but that it is indistinguishable from refusing unwanted medical
treatment. This conclusion seems to rest on the kind of narrow
utilitarian ethic that looks only to the immediate consequences of
an action. The law simply does not operate that way. The legality
of conduct quite often turns upon the intention of the actor and
the circumstances.245
Moreover, the court fails to consider the adverse consequenc-
es of suicide to the deceased, to the decedent's family, or to oth-
ers who may be contemplating suicide. Without analysis or com-
ment, the court also disregards a long line of cases that have
drawn a distinction between the refusal of life-sustaining treatment
and suicide.246 It was this distinction that led courts to conclude
in the first place that under some circumstances an individual
could refuse life-sustaining treatment. The underlying presumption
was that states always have and always can proscribe an affirmative
act of homicide or suicide. Incredibly, this presumption was cast
aside in Compassion in Dying with no recognition of the long-recog-
nized distinction between refusing treatment and suicide. What is
worse, it was cast aside not as a legislative judgment, but as a
matter of constitutional law. Why the Constitution should command
states to treat the refusal of treatment just as it treats suicide is
nowhere justified in the court's decision.
244 Id.
245 See, e.g., 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law §§ 129-57.
246 Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1461; see also supra notes 43-45 and accom-




Responsibility for answering the pressing questions of the day,
including the issue of suicide, ultimately resides with the people of
our nation and communities. That is the very essence of a democ-
racy. Requiring that the answers be devised within constitutional
limits does not undermine democracy. The Constitution itself is a
consensual document, representing the will of our people. But if
our Constitution becomes simply a font into which our courts
pour their own values in disregard of the traditions and history
that have shaped our nation, they will be disregarding the will of
the nation that holds to the Constitution as its charter.24 We will
then cease to be a nation of constitutional and democratic gov-
ernment, and will be ruled instead by judicial fiat.
The Quill decision reminds us that "[u]nder the United States
Constitution and the federal system it establishes, the resolution of
[the] issue [of assisted suicide] is left to the normal democratic
processes within the State."248 The question "is appropriately left
to the citizenry for resolution."249 However, there is another di-
mension to the problem which we have not discussed. If, as we
have argued, states are not constitutionally required to permit assist-
ed suicide, are they constitutionally prohibited from exempting
some special class of persons (such as the terminally ill) from the
usual protections that citizens enjoy against their own suicidal
wishes? This question, deemed serious enough to justify the issu-
ance of a preliminary injunction of the Oregon Act, still remains
to be answered.
The consequences of ignoring history and tradition in either
247 One justice writes:
Because the Constitution itself is ordained and established by the people of the
United States, constitutional adjudication by this Court does not, in theory at
any rate, frustrate the authority of the people to govern themselves through
institutions of their own devising and in accordance with principles of their own
choosing. But decisions that find in the Constitution principles or values that
cannot fairly be read into that document usurp the people's authority, for such
decisions represent choices that the people have never made and that they can-
not disavow through corrective legislation.
Thomburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 787
(1986) (White, J., dissenting).
248 Quill v. Koppell, No. 94 Civ. 5321, 1994 WL 702800, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15,
1994).
249 People v. Kevorkian, Nos. 99591, 99674, 99752, 99758, 99759, 1994 WL 700448, at
*14 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994) (consolidated cases).
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the judicial or legislative forum are serious. A nation, like a per-
son, can lose its moral compass if it disengages itself from the
traditions from which it was born. Those traditions, enshrined in
and protected by law, shape us as a nation and as local communi-
ties. Our nation and local communities in turn shape personal
character, which makes moral understanding of any kind possible.
The content of our laws is therefore critical to who we become.
The law must take into account not just the legal status of the
individual, but a proper understanding of the common good. As
Mary Ann Glendon has pointed out,"o Americans have a rich
vocabulary for describing individual rights and a remarkably im-
poverished vocabulary for describing communitarian interests. The
prevailing ethic, sadly, seems to be to preserve at any cost the
individual even to the extent of isolating him from the human
community altogether. Many (including us) would say that this iso-
lation has already taken place in the case of abortion, and it
threatens to happen again in the case of assisted suicide.
A recent reflection on the consequences of an ethos in which
personal choice trumps all other interests is a fitting conclusion to
this study on assisted suicide:
The contention that there is no objective or universal truth has
achieved a measure of official status among us by fiat of the
Supreme Court. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey ... [it] de-
clared that it is up to each individual to determine "the con-
cept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mys-
tery of human life".... When truth itself is democra-
tized-when truth is no more than the will of each individual
or a majority of individuals-democracy, deprived of the claim
to truth, stands naked to its enemies. Thus does freedom, when
it is not "ordered to truth," undo freedom."
Much the same can be said of assisted suicide. As a society, we
have never permitted an individual to give up all his rights and
liberties, and we should not begin now to permit the exercise of a
"freedom" that amounts to a renunciation of freedom. We should
stand firm against this last claimed "choice," lest we surrender the
value upon which all our liberty rests.
250 See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE (1991).
251 Richard Neuhaus, The Splendor of Truth: A Symposium, FIRST THINGS, Jan. 1994, at
15.
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